Historical Legacies of Interethnic Competition: Anti-Semitism and the EU Referendum in Poland

Volha Charnysh *

Published in *Comparative Political Studies*

2015, Vol. 48(13) 1711–1745

Abstract

How do historical legacies shape contemporary political outcomes? The article proposes a novel attitudinal mechanism through which distant interethnic competition can influence political preferences in the present. It theorizes that historically conditioned predispositions at the local level can moderate the effects of national-level framing of a policy issue. Using Poland as a test case, I show that subnational variation in support for EU accession was influenced by populist claims about the increase in Jewish influence in the postaccession period. Anti-Semitic cues resonated with voters in areas with historically large Jewish populations and a contentious interethnic past, where latent anti-Semitism persisted throughout the communist period. To provide evidence for this argument, the article draws on rich historical and contemporary data at the county, town, and individual level of analysis and utilizes novel research methods.

*PhD Candidate, Harvard University, Department of Government. Email: vcharnysh@fas.harvard.edu.

Many thanks to Bart Bonikowski, Tomasz Blusiewicz, Pawel Bukowski, Keith Darden, Grzegorz Ekiert, Ryan Enos, Julie Faller, Jeffrey Frieden, Konstantin Kashin, Iacob Koch-Weser, Noam Lupu, Steven Wilkinson, Daniel Ziblatt, and the participants in CES Graduate Workshop on Comparative Historical Research, Political and History Conference at Yale, as well as Comparative Workshop at Harvard for the excellent feedback. I am also grateful for the suggestions made by the anonymous reviewers and the editors.

Introduction

For centuries, Europe was defined by ethnic diversity, but the two world wars and their aftermath dramatically homogenized the continent. By far the most important transformation was the murder of over 6 million Jews in World War II (WWII). Although the Holocaust remains salient in today's political discourse, political scientists have largely overlooked the long-term effects of the difficult interethnic past on present-day politics. This article contributes to the literature on the long-term persistence of a broad range of historical legacies – from slavery (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2015) to the content of mass schooling (Darden 2014) to political loyalties (Wittenberg 2006) – by demonstrating that interethnic tensions from the past can influence contemporary policy preferences, even in an ethnically homogeneous environment.

The article proposes a novel attitudinal mechanism that links distant interethnic competition to contemporary political preferences. In particular, I theorize that local historical context may shape baseline predispositions toward an ethnic out-group and that these latent predispositions may influence preferences if and when instrumentalized by political entrepreneurs. Contemporary out-group cues may thus interact with historically conditioned predispositions.

Using Poland as a test case, I uncover an association between the size of the Jewish population before the Holocaust, persecution of Jews in 1941, and opposition to EU integration in 2003. At the time of the EU referendum, the populist right opposed accession by linking it to the growth of Jewish influence in Poland. The persuasiveness of these national-level cues depended on the prevalence of anti-Semitism at the local level. I demonstrate that anti-Semitic voters were concentrated in the areas that had larger Jewish populations before WWII and experienced pogroms in 1941. Hostility toward Jews in these localities traces its origins to the intergroup competition in the interwar period, when the persecution of Jews was sanctioned by the Polish state and the Church. Anti-Semitism was then transmitted from one generation to another despite the virtual disappearance of Jews following the Holocaust. Concerns over the material gains secured at the expense of Jewish neighbors during WWII and regular manifestations of anti-Semitism by the communist state reinforced the persistence of anti-Semitism in some localities more than half a century later.

To test this argument empirically, the article draws on rich historical and contemporary data at the county and individual levels of analysis and utilizes novel research methods, such as GIS mapping and sequential g-estimation. It also considers possible structural pathways through which the presence and elimination of Jews may have influenced contemporary political preferences,concluding that the influence of pre-WWII interethnic competition on EU preferences does not travel through the socioeconomic legacies of the Holocaust.

The article does not reject existing socioeconomic explanations of EU integration preferences but seeks to supplement them by highlighting deeper, historical causes. It builds on the broader literature that sees identity as an important resource in domestic politics, used to promote a particular vision of economic reform (Appel and Gould 2000) or foreign policy (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

The findings engage the literature on the remarkable persistence of attitudes over time (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2015; Grosfeld, Rodnyansky, and Zhuravskaya 2013; Peisakhin 2013; Voigtländer and Voth 2012a). Going beyond this excellent research, the article specifies the conditions under which historical legacies may come to matter. By emphasizing that political entrepreneurs play an important role in activating the past and in linking latent attitudes with contemporary policy issues, it incorporates a variable component in the static conceptualization of long-term persistence. This approach can help explain, for example, why imperial legacies matter in one election but not in the other, or why legacies reappear after having been invisible for decades.

Besides its broader agenda of connecting the past to contemporary political outcomes, the article advances historical research by demonstrating linkages between national (elite framing) and subnational (variation in historical context) levels of a political system. Historically determined susceptibility to elite framing may help us to understand subnational variation across a broad range of political phenomena. Attitudinal legacies of communism could clarify, for example, why the costs and benefits of identical economic policies are perceived differently in different regions.

The article begins with a brief review of the dominant theoretical approaches to EU integration preferences. I then outline my argument regarding the interaction of historical legacies and contemporary elite framing and apply it to the Polish case. In the section titled “Empirical Testing,” I demonstrate the influence of anti-Semitism by analyzing historical and contemporary data at the county,

town, and individual level, also taking into account alternative explanations. Finally, I draw on extant research on Poland to illustrate the mechanisms that account for intergenerational persistence of outgroup hostility.

Explaining EU Attitudes: Instrumentality or Identity?

In June 2003, Poland held a referendum on the EU accession. Although the final result was a resounding "Yes," with 77% of voters favoring accession,the share of votes in favor of EU membership ranged from a mere 40% to an overwhelming 90% at the county level. What explains such wide variation in preferences?

The dominant theoretical explanations of EU preferences were developed for Western Europe, where market economies have long been in place. They have focused on the uneven distribution of the economic costs and benefits of membership (Gabel 1998a,b). According to this perspective, calculations of economic net benefits –either individual or collective – shape citizens' opinions about integration. Unskilled labor is typically seen at a disadvantage and thus more likely to oppose integration. Subnational variation in EU attitudes thus results from the uneven distribution of the economic "winners" and "losers" (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Building on instrumental approaches, scholars of Central and Eastern Europe have proposed that joining the EU means cementing this region's transition to the market economy and democratic governance. The "winners" of the 1989 transition are more likely to favor EU integration than the "losers" (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002).

In post-communist Poland, the "losers" were older, less-educated Poles living in rural areas, especially farmers and pensioners, as well as workers of state enterprises. The "winners" were the young, the better-educated residents of towns and cities, especially businessmen, students, and private sector employees (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002). Instrumental approaches predict that opposition to the EU will be concentrated in the areas with larger shares of "losers" and smaller shares of "winners".

A growing body of scholarship has challenged this instrumental approach. For example, Carey and Burton (2004) argue that ordinary citizens generally lack the ability to evaluate the complex long-term consequences of EU integration and thus rely on elite cues to form their opinions. Drawing on

cognitive and social psychology, this line of work has proposed that "underlying values and interests need to be primed to become politically salient" and to affect preferences (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 424). Thus, public opinion is shaped by the persuasiveness of the arguments for and against EU membership advanced by domestic political elites, which may or may not be focused on socioeconomic factors. Scholars cognizant of this dynamic have found, for example, that in some states attitudes toward foreign out-groups and the extent of exclusiveness of national identity have shaped integration preferences above and beyond "pocket-book" concerns (Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLauren 2002). Building on these identity-based approaches to EU integration, I theorize when and where attitudes toward the out-group may outweigh economic considerations in shaping EU preferences.

Theoretical Argument

When Attitudes Toward the Out-Group Matter: Group-Centric Framing

Group attitudes are essential to simplifying and interpreting the political world (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971). They function as cognitive heuristics that reduce complex and ambivalent policy evaluations to judgments based on a few simple criteria (Conover 1984; Popkin 1991). Group attitudes are powerful tools not only because they simplify decision-making but also because they activate strong emotional responses (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Kinder and Sanders 1996). The combination of emotional and cognitive power may be why group attitudes are often "a primary ingredient in public opinion" (Nelson and Kinder 1996, 1071). Preferences on a broad range of issues are shaped by attitudes toward the groups that are perceived as benefiting from or supporting these issues (Conover 1984; Nelson and Kinder 1996). Support for policies as diverse as welfare (Winter 2008), crime (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005), health care (Tesler 2012), and immigration (Wright and Citrin 2011) has been linked to group-centric beliefs. European integration is no exception (Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLauren 2002).

However, it is not guaranteed that voters will make the connection between a certain out-group and a policy. Indeed, only some policy issues are perceived as benefiting particular groups over others. It

has been shown that deliberate framing can (a) establish an association between a specific group and a policy and (b) increase the salience of this association in the decisionmaking process (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). As Hurwitz and Peffley (2005, 109) describe:

> When messages are framed in such a way as to reinforce the relationship between a particular policy and a particular group, it becomes far more likely that individuals will evaluate the policy on the basis of their evaluations of the group.

Thus, out-group attitudes influence preferences on a given policy issue only *when* out-group-focused issue framing is salient in the political discourse. Furthermore, the strength of the association between out-group attitudes and policy preferences varies based on the salience of group-centric framing over time.

Which Frame? Framing in a Competitive Environment

Multiple frames are generally prominent in the political discourse. What makes a frame more or less effective? Although the previous section emphasizes the emotional and cognitive power of group-centric frames, not all voters will find such frames convincing. Preexisting attitudes are perhaps one of the best-understood moderators of framing effects (Chong and Druckman 2007). People question and even reject frames that contradict their strongly held views and accept frames that conform to their views (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001).[1] Thus, preexisting affective and cognitive attitudes toward an out-group will mitigate or amplify the effects of group-centric cues.

Socioeconomic standing can also moderate framing effects. Potential "losers" of EU integration might rely on elite cues to realize that they will be disadvantaged by integration. In an important distinction from instrumental approaches, economic vulnerability affects preferences indirectly, by weakening or strengthening the relevance of elite cues regarding the economic effects of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

An important moderator of framing effects in societies with stable party systems and ideological cleavages is partisanship. However, partisanship in post-communist states arguably plays a smaller

[1] Other moderators include deliberation, political information, source credibility, and competition.

role in the formation of preferences due to weak partisan identification and high levels of electoral volatility (Kitschelt et al. 1999). In Poland, most strident opposition to the EU came from a party that did not exist until 2001, two years before the accession vote.

Historical Legacies as Moderators of Framing

This article proposes that historical context can shape receptiveness to particular frames alongside contemporary factors. Although there are several possible channels through which history might matter, here I distinguish between attitudinal and structural legacies.

History can leave a structural residue. For example, despotism and exploitation – not to mention large-scale atrocities such as the Holocaust – can leave enduring legacies by depriving a region of human capital or reducing institutional capacity (Acemoglu, Hassan, and Robinson 2011; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). To the extent that socioeconomic factors are salient in policy debates, structural legacies influence present-day preferences.

This article instead emphasizes attitudinal legacies. An influential body of literature has shown that formal institutions continue to shape attitudes long after their demise (Becker et al. 2011; Peisakhin 2013). Interethnic competition may similarly create attitudes that will outlast the presence of the rival out-group (Grosfeld, Rodnyansky, and Zhuravskaya 2013; Voigtländer and Voth 2012a). I contend that the historically determined variation in out-group attitudes can influence preferences on ostensibly unrelated issues, *if* and *when* political elites emphasize linkages between an out-group and a policy. The following section applies these propositions to the Polish context.

The EU in Poland: When and Where Anti-Semitic Frames Succeeded

In the years leading up to the 2003 referendum, populist elites in Poland resorted to anti-Semitic cues to mobilize opposition to EU accession. Anti-Semitic framing, however, resonated only with voters who held strong anti-Semitic predispositions. Other voters were more likely to form opinions about

the EU based on economy-oriented frames, also salient in the political discourse. Thus, in some localities, opposition to EU membership was influenced by the interaction of anti-Semitic framing and preexisting hostility toward Jews.

Anti-EU Frames in Polish Discourse

On the eve of the referendum, opponents of EU integration advanced both economic and group-centric arguments. On the economic side, Polish farmers were widely portrayed as the losers of integration. One of the thorniest negotiating points was the level of agricultural subsidies, set to just 25% of payments to farmers in the existing member states. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL [*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*]) advocated for a tough negotiating stance on this issue and threatened to keep the tariffs on the European agricultural products (Beichelt 2004). Ultimately, though, PSL supported accession, and less than 15% of its constituents voted against accession in 2003 (Jasiewicz 2004).

Unequivocal opposition to the EU came instead from Self-Defense (*Samoobrona*) on the left and from the League of Polish Families (the LPR [*Liga Polskich Rodzin*]) on the right, which won 10% and 8% of the vote in the 2001 parliamentary election, respectively. Though at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, these radical parties espoused ethnonationalism and conceived of EU integration as a betrayal of the right to national self-determination.

Self-Defense was born in 1994 as a "single-issue protest movement" of indebted farmers (Pankowski 2010, 133). Like the PSL, Self-Defense claimed that EU accession would undermine the Polish agricultural sector. Indeed, efforts by Self-Defense to rally farmers against the EU coincided with PSL's efforts to secure concessions for farmers. In contrast to the PSL, however, the party often framed economic arguments in anti-Semitic terms (Pankowski 2010, 139). In a 1994 protest, for example, Self-Defense activists cut out a Star of David on the head of the symbolic oppressor of the Polish farmers – the debt collector.

While Self-Defense offered voters a semblance of an economic argument, the LPR was exclusively focused on the cosmopolitan, Jewish, and Masonic threats to the Polish nation (Pankowski 2010, 128). The party emerged just a few months before the 2001 election and was led by Roman

Giertych, whose grandfather Jędrzej was a prominent activist in the interwar National Democracy (ND [*Endecja*]) movement, infamous for inciting violence against Jews (Michlic 2006). Giertych's LPR appropriated verbatim Endecja's arguments about the alleged Jewish conspiracy against Poland. Anti-Semitism became a key frame in the party's interpretation of the communist past and post-communist present. As Pankowski (2010) demonstrates, the party criticized the Stalinist period for supporting "Judeopolonia," applauded the communist crackdown on "Jewish-Trotskyists," and perceived the Solidarity movement as "even more Jewish and more strongly connected with the Jewish camp in world politics" than the communist regime.[2]

The party's unexpected electoral success in 2001 may have been facilitated by the wave of discontent following the April 2000 publication of Jan Gross's Neighbors about the massacre of Jews by Polish neighbors in Jedwabne (Wolentarska-Ochman 2006). The LPR campaigned in television spots by denying the 1941 pogrom (Pankowski 2010) and won 20% of the vote (2.5 times its national vote share) in Jedwabne. Surveys indicate that more than 50% of the LPR's supporters were "strongly anti-Semitic" while only 27% showed no signs of anti-Semitism (Krzeminski 2004, 48-49).

The LPR argued that cosmopolitan Jewish influence threatened Poland in virtually all realms of life – from political (the loss of sovereignty and independence) to cultural (the encroachment of a culture that condones abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriages). In a 2002 interview, deputy head Zygmunt Wrzodak summed up the party's anti-EU stance by claiming that the EU served the common interest of Jews and Germans, empowered the "global Jewish nation and a European German nation," and was controlled by the Freemasonry.[3]

These xenophobic cues were reinforced by the nationwide Catholic radio network *Radio Maryja* and related publications *Nasz Dziennik* and *Nasza Polska*. *Radio Maryja* warned listeners that foreign Jews were reclaiming Polish passports to benefit from EU membership. Speakers invited onto the program claimed that Polish farmers had been encouraged to set aside land for 200,000 to 500,000 Jews with Polish documents.[4] In effect, *Radio Maryja* conflated general anti-Semitism with specific

[2]Giertych, Jędrzej. 1990. Polski Obóz Narodowy [Polish National Camp]. Warszawa: Biblioteka Słowa Narowodewo, p. 40. Cited in Pankowski (2010, 115).

[3]Radio Maryja podcast 2002. Retrieved from http://www.radiomaryja.pl.eu.org/ nagrania/20020415-wrzodak/20020415-wrzodak.mp3

[4]See *Nash Dziennik* 2003. Prof. Czesław Bartnik, "Polsko, larum grają," RM, 18:30 and repeats, read by Marek Pralat,

concerns that Jews could lay claim to Polish wealth and property after EU accession. *Nasz Dziennik* published articles with provocative titles such as "Jewish Brussels" ("Bruksel(k)a pozydowsku," January 12, 2002) and reiterated Wrzodak's line that the "international Jewish lobby" wants Poland to join the EU (March 16-17, 2002).

The anti-Semitic cues described above were disseminated nationwide. With its four million listeners, *Radio Maryja* was the third most popular national private broadcaster and the only Catholic broadcaster with listeners in all of Poland's provinces.[5]

Although the attention to Jews in EU accession debate may seem surprising, anti-Semitic frames have a long tradition in Polish politics. The Jew as a national threat can be considered "both an intrinsic element and a product of Polish nation building" (Michlic 2006, 26). Even though Poles' relationship with other national minorities has also been difficult, it is the Jewish minority that historically served as the scapegoat for the state, the Church, and civil society. After WWII, as the Jewish population was reduced to the tens of thousands, the communist regime continued to deploy anti-Semitic attacks. Following the 1989 transition, negative references to Jews continued to outnumber references to any other out-groups in the political discourse. While Germans, Ukrainians, and Russians are also viewed with suspicion, the Jews have occupied a special status of "foreigners within" (Kofta and Bilewicz 2011). Jewish rather than German or Russian conspiracy theories have traditionally dominated the political landscape. Only the Jewish label has been used to signal to voters that a politician cannot be trusted (Forecki 2008), and "lists of Jews" (but not of Germans or Ukrainians) have been circulated at election time in the countryside (Tokarska-Bakir 2009, 305).

Why Anti-Semitic Cues Were More Effective in Some Localities Than in Others

I propose that the influence of national-level anti-Semitic framing of the EU on public opinion was moderated by the prevalence of anti-Semitism at the local level. Voters who strongly disliked Jews were more likely to absorb and act on the cues that linked EU membership to Jewish influence.

October 4.

[5]The 2002 data on *Radio Maryja* listeners were obtained from Radio Track-KBR, N = 92,729.

Furthermore, anti-Semitic voters were concentrated in the areas where interethnic competition was historically high. I argue that in the prewar period, the size of the Jewish out-group was associated with its visibility and the perceived political and economic threat to the local Poles, which is why pogroms were more likely to occur in areas with a large Jewish population and why these areas are more anti-Semitic today.

Numbering nearly 3 million in 1931, Poland's Jewish community was the largest in Europe. Jews were far more numerous and visible than Germans (741 thousand) or Belarusians (990 thousand) and, in contrast to Ukrainians (4.4 million), considered impossible to assimilate. In the 1930s, the majority of Polish Jews voted for ethnic political parties, spoke Yiddish rather than Polish, and strictly observed the religious law (Hagen 1996).

The presence of a large ethnic out-group need not inevitably lead to intergroup competition. Some states have successfully integrated their ethnic minorities and prevented intercommunal violence (Dumitru 2011). In interwar Poland, however, hostility and violence toward Jews were encouraged by the state, the ND movement, and the Catholic Church (Michlic 2006). A Jewish politician described the plight of the Jewish minority in 1934 as follows: "The N.D.s make [pogroms] whilst the government [. . . wants] to deprive Jews of all means of living" (Hagen 1996, 357). In 1935-1937 alone, about 100 large anti-Jewish pogroms occurred, with dozens killed and 2,000 injured.[6] Another wave of pogroms rolled across northeast Poland in 1941, as the German army invaded the territories initially occupied by the Soviet Union. Anti-Semitic violence took place only in localities where the Jewish minority was highly visible. As Kopstein and Wittenberg (2011, 268) note, "No pogrom occurred in any settlement with fewer than 360 Jews."

The size and the perceived economic and political influence of the Jewish minority were seen as "objective" reasons for anti-Semitism by ethnonationalist political forces (Michlic 2006, 173). Their claims as well as the demographic profile of the communities that experienced pogroms suggest the applicability of group conflict theory, which argues that the larger the size of the out-group, the greater its economic and political threat and the more negative attitudes it evokes (Blalock 1967; Sherif and Sherif 1953). The mechanisms driving out-group hostility are "exclusively local" because group

[6]Polski Slownik Judaistyczny, Żydowski Instytut Historczny. Retrieved from http://www.jhi.pl/psj/pogrom

competition is a function of group size, geographic proximity, and resource pool (Hopkins 2010, 41).

The main charge leveled against Jews was their alleged support for the communists. Although few Jews voted for communists, about two thirds supported minority parties (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2003). The Jewish vote presented a very real threat to the political power of Endecja and its Polish supporters in the localities where Jews were numerous. Perceived economic threat was another driver of hostility toward the Jewish out-group at the local level. The notion of Jewish economic power was widespread (Bauer 2010), and the boycott of Jewish businesses was one of the immediate triggers of pogroms in the 1930s (Michlic 2006).

Anti-Semitism Without Jews

As noted earlier, for group hostility to develop, people must be aware of their ethnic context and perceive the out-group as a threat. Although that seems plausible during the pre-WWII period, when Poland had over 3 million Jews (about 10% of the population), it is far less likely in contemporary Poland, which has only a few thousand Jews (less than 1% of the population).[7] Yet Figure 1 demonstrates that even after the Holocaust, despite some improvement, attitudes toward Jews in Poland have been largely negative (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej [CBOS], 2012; OBOP, 1989).

Many decades since, the threat of the "imagined" Jewish community still looms large. In a 1996 poll, 14% of respondents claimed that "one million or more" Jews lived in the country, and only one third estimated the number of Jews to be below 100 thousand (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 1997).

What is more, anti-Semitism seems more prevalent in the localities that had large Jewish populations before WWII. As an opinion survey conducted by CBOS in May 2000 (N = 1,057) shows, current residents of localities where Jews were once present are more likely to report anti-Semitic behaviors (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 2000). The survey asked about such anti-Semitic actions as dissemination of publications against Jews, statements that Jews rule the world or Poland, statements blaming Jews for communism, the pejorative use of the word "Jews," anti-Semitic inscriptions

[7]The 2002 census estimated that there are 1,100 Jews in Poland. Jewish organization Joint counted 4,500 members at the end of the 1990s (Datner 2012).

Figure 1: **The share of respondents who expressed positive attitudes toward Jews in 1975-2012.**



on walls or other objects, and instances of Holocaust denial.

All of these behaviors are more prevalent in the areas where, according to the respondents, Jews lived before WWII (see Table 1). Analyzing their self-reported geographic locations shows that reported anti-Semitism indeed correlates with pre-WWII Jewish presence. How anti-Semitism could persist for such a long time is discussed later in the article.

Table 1: Percentages of Respondents Who Encountered Anti-Semitic Behaviors in Their Communities, Tabulated by Pre-WWII Jewish Presence.

	Jewish presence			
Anti-Semitic behavior	Yes (%)	No (%)	Difference (%)	p value
Statement “Jews rule the world”	58	41	18	0.000
Anti-Semitic graffiti	39	24	15	0.000
Drawings of the Star of David	34	22	12	0.002
Pejorative use of “ Jews”	30	18	12	0.002
Pejorative use of “Zydek” and “Yitzhak”	39	28	11	0.008
Blaming Jews for communism	28	19	9	0.011
Statement “ Jews rule Poland”	60	52	8	0.078
Denial of the Holocaust	20	13	7	0.039
Dissemining publications	16	12	4	0.234

Theoretical Expectations

The discussion suggests several predictions about the relationship between anti-Semitism, pre-WWII Jewish presence, and EU preferences in Poland.

Hypothesis 1: The share of the pre-WWII Jewish population and pogrom occurrences will be negatively associated with EU support in the 2003 referendum.

Hypothesis 2: The share of the pre-WWII Jewish population and pogrom occurrences will be positively associated with contemporary anti-Semitism.

Hypothesis 3: The association between anti-Semitism and EU preferences will increase with the salience of anti-Semitic framing, that is, as the referendum approaches, and decrease when EU accession is no longer being contested.

Empirical Testing

Historic Diversity and EU Support

This section examines the relationship between the pre-WWII shares of the Jewish population, used as a proxy for out-group threat in line with the literature on group conflict, and support for EU integration at the county (*powiat*) level, the smallest administrative unit at which detailed historical data on religious affiliation, literacy, and economic conditions is available.[8]

The main dependent variable is the share of the pro-EU vote from all valid votes cast in the 2003 referendum in 1931 counties (see Figure 2). The referendum results were collected at the level of municipality (*gmina*).[9] I then used GIS mapping to overlay the borders of pre-WWII counties onto contemporary municipalities and aggregated the municipality-level data up to the level of 181 pre-WWII counties. In 1931, Poland had 266 counties. Today, about a third of these counties are in Belarus, Ukraine, or Lithuania. The data set omits the 87 pre-WWII counties that are no longer in Poland, as well as 150 contemporary counties that belonged to Germany until 1945.

[8]Reconstructing individual behavior from county-level data poses an ecological inference problem. Therefore, I supplement county-level analyses with the analysis of survey data.

[9]The data were obtained from *Glowny Urzad Statystyczny* (The Central Statistical Office of Poland, GUS) and *Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza* (The National Electoral Commission).

Figure 2: **The proportion of votes in favor of EU accession in the 2003 referendum calculated for 181 pre-WWII counties used in the analysis.**



The main explanatory variable is the fraction of Jews from the latest pre-WWII Polish national census (see Figure 3). The 1931 census was criticized for exaggerating the number of ethnic Poles (Corrsin 1998). However, this would bias estimates in the downward direction. Moreover, historians have noted that Polish officials were less likely to falsify the religious affiliation data used in the analysis and that the numbers of the Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities were most affected by the falsification.

According to the census, the Jewish minority was concentrated in the former Russian and Austrian partitions. Jews lived primarily in small towns, with some shtetls being up to 60% Jewish. In rural areas, the maximum share of the Jewish population was 10%.

Figure 3: **Proportion of the Jewish population by county according to the 1931 census.**



I control for a number of pretreatment variables from the 1931 census.[10] In line with Kopstein and Wittenberg's (2011) work on pogroms, I control for the fraction of Catholic (Polish) population. In some regression models, I instead control for the shares of specific ethnic groups, namely, Germans (proxied by Evangelical believers), Belarusians (proxied by Orthodox believers), and Ukrainians (proxied by Greek Catholic believers). Because the Jewish minority was predominant in urban areas, I control for the share of the urban population. In addition, because Jews were more prevalent in the poorer, primarily agricultural parts of Poland, regressions control for the share of the population involved in agriculture. To separate the effect of Jewish presence from that of the educated middle class, I control for the share of literate population. Regressions also control for population size, which affected the frequency of interethnic interactions. Some regressions include dummy variables for the

[10]Including contemporary variables presents post-treatment bias problem, explored in detail below.

Prussian and Austrian partitions and others exclude the Prussian partition altogether, to account for the historical circumstances that affected the distribution of the Jewish population as well as the nature of interethnic relations. The Prussian partition was, on the one hand, more economically developed than the Russian and Austrian partitions, and, on the other hand, contained a very small proportion of the Jewish population the share of the population involved in agriculture.[11]

Regression results presented in Table 2 support the hypothesis that the presence of Jews is associated with lower EU support at the subnational level. The coefficient on share Jewish is negative, large, and significant at the 95% level or higher in all models. Excluding the Prussian partition increases its magnitude. The share of the population involved in agriculture is also negatively associated with EU support, suggesting the importance of persistent differences in regional economies.

Substantively, a 10% increase in the share of the Jewish population at the county level is associated with a 3% to 6% decrease in the pro-EU vote. This would mean that counties without Jews in 1931 would demonstrate anywhere between 9% and 18% greater support for the EU than counties where the Jewish minority accounted for about 30% of the population. To sum up, EU support in 2003 was weaker in the areas where the Jewish out-group was more visible before WWII, confirming Hypothesis 1.

Socioeconomic Legacies of the Holocaust or Hostility Toward Jews?

I now examine two possible explanations for the association between pre-WWII interethnic context and the 2003 EU vote: (a) the attitudinal legacy of interethnic competition – anti-Semitism, in line with the argument advanced in the article and (b) the structural legacy of the Holocaust – economic backwardness.

The article argues that the Jewish presence prior to WWII is associated with greater anti-Semitism today and that anti-Semitism moderated the effects of group-centric framing of the EU. One measure of anti-Semitism available at the municipal level is the share of the vote for the LPR, an unambiguously anti-Semitic party that eschewed economic arguments in its platform. Since two thirds of the LPR's voters harbor anti-Semitism (Krzeminski 2004), the party's performance in the 2001

[11] See the online appendix for descriptive statistics.

Table 2: **The Association Between the Fraction of the Pre-WWII Jewish Population and the Pro-EU Vote in 2003.**

	DV: Pro-EU vote in the 2003 referendum			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share Jewish	**−0.377*****	**−0.285*****	**−0.686*****	**−0.644*****
	(0.119)	**(0.102)**	**(0.170)**	**(0.168)**
Share Catholic	−0.081**		−0.046	
	(0.035)		(0.043)	
Share Orthodox		−0.033		−0.002
		(0.068)		(0.076)
Share Evangelical		0.165**		−0.030
		(0.079)		(0.181)
Share Greek Catholic		0.093*		0.076
		(0.048)		(0.054)
Share urban	0.001	0.004	0.169**	0.164**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Share literate	−0.002	−0.029	−0.298**	−0.246
	(0.104)	(0.118)	(0.142)	(0.155)
Share in agriculture	−0.279***	−0.278***	−0.277***	−0.271***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Austrian partition	0.056***	0.056***	0.083***	0.071***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Prussian partition	0.019	0.019		
	(0.031)	(0.033)		
Log(population))	0.016	0.019*	0.033**	0.033**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	0.765***	0.666***	0.687***	0.615***
	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.204)	(0.202)
Observations	181	181	120	120
R^2	0.670	0.678	0.590	0.593

Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. The dependent variable is the share of "Yes" votes. Models 3 and 4 exclude Prussian partition. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Coefficients on the key explanatory variable are in bold. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

election, when the issue of Polish–Jewish relations was especially salient, is used as a proxy for anti-Semitism.[12]

The presence and subsequent elimination of the Jewish population may have also had persistent socioeconomic consequences, which could moderate the effects of anti-EU economic framing in the 2003 referendum. In this case, anti-Semitism would not be a part of the causal chain that connects pre-WWII demography with contemporary EU preferences despite the existence of the association of the Jewish presence and weaker EU support. Indeed, Acemoglu et al. (2011) have found that Russian cities where Jews were eliminated have grown less and that Russian regions affected by the Holocaust have lower per capita income today. The elimination of the Jewish educated middle class may have had similar consequences in Poland.

An intuitive measure of the economic impact of the Holocaust, GDP per capita, is not available at the municipal level. Instead, I use income tax per capita collected within each municipality.[13] I also examine two other indicators of economic development posited as important by the literature on EU preferences that could have been influenced by the elimination of Jews: (a) the share of private sector employees from total employees in 2002 and (b) the share of the unemployed from the total economically active population in 2002. All of these indicators are provided at the municipality level by the Central Statistical Office of Poland and were aggregated up to the level of 1931 counties to be matched with the historical variables from the 1931 census.

Table 3 examines the association between the fraction of the Jewish population in 1931 and these attitudinal and socioeconomic indicators, controlling for historic covariates. We see that the coefficient on *Share Jewish* is positive and significant when the dependent variable is the anti-Semitic vote. Substantively, a 10% increase in the pre-WWII county-level share of the Jewish population is associated with about a 2.6% increase in the vote for the anti-Semitic LPR in the 2001 election. All other things equal, counties without Jews in 1931 would demonstrate 8% weaker support for the LPR than counties where the Jewish minority accounted for 30% of the population. Because national-level

[12]The data were obtained from *Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza* (National Electoral Commission) at the municipality level and aggregated to fit the pre–World War II (WWII) county borders.

[13]Together with property tax, income tax provides a primary source of income in a given municipality. The basic tax rate of 39.34% does not vary across municipalities.

shares of the vote for the LPR in the 2001 election amounted to 8%, this difference is substantial.

Table 3: **The Association Between the Size of the Pre-WWII Jewish Population and (1) the Share of the LPR Vote in the 2001 Election; (2) Log(Income Tax Per Capita in Polish Zloty in 2002); (3) the Share of the Unemployed From the Total Labor Force in 2002; (4) the Share of Employees in Private Sector From the Total Number of Employees in 2002.**

	anti-Semitic vote	Log(income tax)	Unemployment	Private sector
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share Jewish	**0.260*****	**−0.659**	**−0.037**	**−0.154**
	(0.062)	**(0.557)**	**(0.044)**	**(0.142)**
Share Catholic	0.049***	0.264	−0.026**	0.047
	(0.018)	(0.165)	(0.013)	(0.049)
Share urban	0.015	−0.016	0.016	0.082*
	(0.016)	(0.147)	(0.012)	(0.049)
Share literate	−0.009	1.085**	−0.128***	0.472***
	(0.054)	(0.486)	(0.038)	(0.094)
Share in agriculture	0.067***	−1.262***	−0.013	0.135**
	(0.019)	(0.169)	(0.013)	(0.056)
Austrian partition	0.052***	−0.026	0.009	−0.044***
	(0.008)	(0.073)	(0.006)	(0.017)
Prussian partition	0.020	−0.236	0.023**	
	(0.016)	(0.148)	(0.012)	
Log(population)	−0.006	0.210***	−0.010***	0.016
	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.004)	(0.015)
Constant	0.042	2.692***	0.322***	−0.073
	(0.075)	(0.672)	(0.053)	(0.220)
Observations	181	181	181	181
R^2	0.444	0.712	0.201	0.316

Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. Standard errors are given in parentheses. LPR = Liga Polskich Rodzin. Coefficients on the key explanatory variable are in bold. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The coefficient on *Share Jewish* is negative but does not reach statistical significance in the three regression models with socioeconomic indicators as dependent variables. It does seem, however, that counties most affected by the Holocaust have lower income today.

Regression results in Table 4 explore the importance of socioeconomic (income tax) and attitudinal (anti-Semitism) legacies in more detail. I follow Acharya et al. (2015, 2015) in using sequential g-estimation to distinguish between these two possible explanations. The authors adapted the method from biostatistics to facilitate the evaluation of alternative causal pathways and the detection of a

variable's role in a causal mechanism. The two-stage estimation method addresses the problem that plagues the majority of studies of long-term effects – post-treatment bias, which arises when evaluating mediators of a given (historical) treatment by simply adding them into regression models as covariates (Acharya 2015).

Table 4: **The association between the size of the pre-WWII Jewish population and the pro-EU vote in 2003.**

	Pro-EU vote in 2003			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share Jewish (1931)	−0.175	−0.180*	−0.364***	−0.371***
	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.113)	(0.133)
Share LPR vote (2001)	−0.758***			
	(0.123)			
Log(income tax) (2002)			0.007***	
			(0.016)	
1931 covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
2000 covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	181	181	181	181
R^2	0.774	0.675	0.722	0.658

Models 1 and 3 include anti-Semitic vote or income tax per capita (2002) as well as intermediate covariates, such as the share private employees, the share of the population over working age, and the share of urban population, in addition to the baseline specification from Table 2, and present ordinary least squares estimates. Models 2 and 4 use sequential g-estimation and include 1931 covariates. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

First, I include (a) the share of anti-Semitic vote or (b) income tax per capita along with the main explanatory variable (*share Jewish*) and historical covariates in regression models. Results are presented in Table 4, Models 1 and 3. When the anti-Semitism proxy is included, the coefficient on share Jewish decreases and loses significance, which indicates that the effect of pre-WWII interethnic context on EU preferences may indeed go largely through the anti-Semitic vote. When the income proxy is included in the model, however, the coefficient on share Jewish remains significant and does not change in magnitude, which suggests that economic development (as proxied by income tax per capita) did not mediate the effect of pre-WWII ethnic context on EU support in the 2003 referendum.

The results produced by simply including contemporary mediators in regressions with historical

variables may suffer from post-treatment bias, as it is hypothesized that anti-Semitism, on one hand, or economic development, on the other hand, are the two possible legacies of distant interethnic competition. To address post-treatment bias, I then transform the dependent variable by subtracting this effect and estimate the effect of share Jewish in 1931 on this transformed variable. We see that the coefficients on share Jewish are similar to those in Table 2 and are significant at the 95% or higher level when the economic mediator is included in Model 4 but not when the anti-Semitism proxy is included (Model 2).

To sum up, the analysis suggests that lower EU support in counties with larger pre-WWII Jewish population did not result from the dampening economic impact of the Holocaust, as measured by income tax or unemployment (see the online appendix for regressions of additional socioeconomic variables). Instead, attitudinal legacies of interethnic competition influenced EU support alongside contemporary socioeconomic factors.

Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that both the anti-EU vote in 2003 and the LPR vote in 2001 represent a protest vote in the areas with a tradition of anti-Semitism. A survey experiment would provide stronger evidence for the argument advanced in the article. Nonetheless, treating respondents with anti-Semitic EU frames poses an ethical dilemma and may also produce biased results when implemented more than a decade since the EU accession.

Population Mobility

Using pre-WWII statistics to study political behavior more than half a century later presumes that most contemporary residents of Polish counties live in the same localities as their parents and grandparents. Is this a valid assumption?

According to the 1950 census, 73.7% of Poles who lived in the region under study had lived there before the onset of WWII. No drastic changes in population mobility occurred since then. The 2002 census indicates that around 63.3% of the population in the counties analyzed still lives in the same area in which they were born.

Contemporary Jewish Presence

A possible explanation for the association between the pre-WWII Jewish population and contemporary anti-Semitism is contemporary Jewish presence. Are Jews today more visible in areas that had larger pre-WWII Jewish communities?

I evaluate this possibility qualitatively because Poland's 2002 census does not report ethnicity in municipalities where a minority group comprises fewer than 10 people. The national census estimate of 1,133 Jews underestimates their contemporary presence in Poland but is arguably an appropriate measure of the minority's visibility. The census identifies only two large Jewish communities in Poland – in Wroclaw and in Warsaw. Of these two cities, only Warsaw had both Polish and Jewish populations before WWII.[14] Thus, the current Jewish presence bears no resemblance to the demographic makeup of the interwar period.

A related possibility is that Jewish tourists are more visible in localities with pre-WWII Jewish presence. The data on tourist itineraries in Poland suggest that the most visited sites are concentration and extermination camps as well as the former Warsaw and Krakow ghettos. Regressions in the online appendix demonstrate that the coefficient on share Jewish increases when the counties frequented by contemporary Jewish tourists are excluded from the analysis.

Wroclaw, Warsaw, Krakow, and other large cities not only had sizable Jewish populations before WWII and have larger Jewish communities today but also demonstrated high levels of EU support in 2003. This again indicates the importance of contemporary socioeconomic factors in determining EU preferences; historical legacies clearly illuminate only a part of the story. It is important to note, however, that before WWII, Jewish presence was largest not in cities such as Warsaw (34% Jewish in 1931), Lodz (32% Jewish), or Krakow (24% Jewish), but in small towns – where most pogroms occurred in the first half of the 20th century and where Jews are virtually nonexistent today.

[14] Wroclaw (Breslau) was a part of Germany before 1945.

Pogroms and EU Attitudes in Northeast Poland

This section examines the legacies of interethnic competition in urban communities of northeast Poland. I use the adapted data set on pogroms that occurred following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, collected and shared by Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg.

The majority of pre-WWII municipalities used in the original data set are today split between three to four contemporary units and thus could not be matched with 2003 referendum results. However, the location of pogroms is available at the level of townships, which still exist today and often comprise entire municipalities or at least entire electoral districts. Thus, I combined the data on pogroms with information on the ethnic composition of all localities that had more than 1,000 inhabitants in 1921, relying on the 1924 *Skorowidz Miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* for Bialystok province. The final data set comprises 70 localities, 26 of which experienced a pogrom initiated by Poles in 1941.[15]

Pogroms are a better proxy for interethnic competition than simple population shares. Another advantage of using the pogroms data is the opportunity to analyze the legacies of interethnic competition at the level of actual communities. Although counties combine towns (where most of the Jewish population lived) and villages (where farmers, considered the losers of EU integration, lived), town-level data allow for a more accurate assessment of community-level ethnic composition and socioeconomic environment. Sixty-six towns in the data set had fewer than 10,000 residents in 1921; 58 had fewer than 10,000 eligible voters in 2003. One disadvantage of using such granular data, available only in the 1921 census, is the absence of historical control variables that are available in the 1931 census at the county level. In addition, data from 1921 overestimate the share of the Jewish population due to the significant out-migration of Jews in the interwar period.

Table 5 examines the association between the level of support for the EU and the LPR and the occurrence of a pogrom in 1941.

Logit regression in Model 1 replicates findings by Kopstein and Wittenberg (2011) on this smaller, town-level data set, confirming that the likelihood of a pogrom increased with the share of the Jewish

[15]Pogroms that occurred in modern-day Belarus or were coded as perpetrated by Germans by Kopstein and Wittenberg were excluded. I also added a pogrom in Jasionówka, listed in several other sources on Poland, and removed a pogrom in Augustów, for which I could not find confirmation.

Table 5: **The Association Between the Occurrence of a Pogrom in 1941 and EU Support in 2003 in Bialystok Region at the Town Level.**

	Porgom occurrence	Share "Yes"		Share LPR	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Share Jewish	**6.485****	**−0.305*****		**0.189*****	
	(3.219)	**(0.092)**		**(0.054)**	
Share Catholic	2.932	−0.312***		0.199***	
	(2.886)	(0.081)		(0.048)	
Porgom			**−0.049****		**0.029***
			(0.024)		**(0.015)**
Log(population)	0.596*	0.069***	0.070***	0.004	0.006
	(0.356)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	−9.460**	0.418***	0.144	−0.101	0.059
	(3.795)	(0.118)	(0.111)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Observations	70	70	70	67	67
R^2		0.364	0.265	0.230	0.076
Log Likelihood	−38.815				
AIC	85.629				
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Logistic (Model 1) and Ordinary Least Squares (Models 2-5) regressions. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Coefficients on the key explanatory variables are in bold. Model 1 demonstrates that the likelihood of a pogrom increases with the share of the Jewish population. Models 2 and 4 demonstrate that the share of the Jewish population is associated with lower EU support and greater share of the LPR vote. Models 3 and 5 demonstrate that the occurrence of a pogrom is associated with lower EU support and greater share of the LPR vote. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

population. When the fraction of Jews rises from 40% (mean) to 50% and other variables are set at their means, the probability of a pogrom increases from 41% to 58%. Results in Table 5 also show that EU support wanes, Model 2, and anti-Semitic vote increases, Model 4, with the fraction of the Jewish population. The magnitudes of the coefficients on share Jewish are similar to those in Table 2. Models 3 and 5 demonstrate that the occurrence of pogroms is associated with lower support for the EU in 2003 and with greater support for the LPR in 2001, respectively. The occurrence of a pogrom is associated with a 5% weaker EU support and 3% greater vote for the anti-Semitic party.[16]

[16]For four of the smallest towns, the data from the 2001 election were unavailable. Thus, I relied on municipality election results and coded the municipality as (1) if a pogrom occurred in any of the towns in the municipality, which explains the lower number of observations in Models 4 and 5.

Changes in the Association of Anti-Semitism and EU Preferences Over Time

If the framing hypothesis is valid, the relationship between anti-Semitism and EU attitudes should be stronger when the anti-Semitic frames of the EU are more salient. I use three waves of the European Values Survey (EVS), conducted in 1990, 1999, and 2008 to test this proposition. The presence of identically worded questions about the EU and Jewish neighbors in all three waves allows for comparing the association between anti-Semitism and EU attitudes *before* the group-centric framing became prominent in the national political discourse (1990), *during* the political debate about the EU accession when anti-Semitic cues were salient (1999), and *after* the EU accession, once the anti-Semitic EU frames disappeared (2008).

The dependent variable is confidence in the EU, proxied by responses to the following question: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in it – a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all? [The European Union]."[17] I recoded responses to this question into a binary variable that equals one for respondents who are "not at all" confident and zero for respondents who expressed "a great deal," "quite a lot," or "not very much" confidence. As argued above, anti-Semitic respondents were likely to staunchly oppose EU accession, rejecting membership rather than expressing Euroskepticism. Thus anti-Semitism should be linked not so much with low EU confidence but with a complete absence of confidence in the European project – the "not at all" response. In 1999, 19.20% of respondents had absolutely no confidence in the EU, which is similar to the proportion of the anti-EU vote in the 2003 referendum (23%).

The main explanatory variable is a dummy coded as 1 if respondents selected Jews from the list of possible undesirable neighbors. To separate the effects of anti-Semitism from general xenophobia, I control for whether respondents also viewed Muslims as undesirable neighbors (dummy coded 1 if Muslims were mentioned). I also control for ideological self-placement (on a scale from 1 [left] to 10 [right]), religiousness (coded 1 if respondents reported being "very religious"), income level (low, medium, and high), age (15-29 years, 30-49 years, and 50 and more years), education level

[17] The question about the intention to vote for EU accession was present in one wave only.

(lower, middle, and upper[18]), as well as the size of the place of residence (localities with fewer than 20 thousand residents are coded 1). Results are presented in Table 6.

We see that anti-Semitism was linked to the lack of confidence in the EU only in the 1999 survey but not in the 1990 or 2008 surveys. The coefficient on anti-Semitism is negative, large, and significant only when the political discourse linking the EU to Jewish influence was becoming salient in the national-level discourse. Substantive interpretation of the logit coefficients suggests that in 1999 anti-Semitic respondents were about twice as likely to have no confidence in the EU. In sum, regression results support the hypothesis that anti-Semitic framing of the EU in the years leading up to the 2003 referendum influenced EU support among anti-Semitic voters. The interaction terms in Models 4 and 5 denote the difference in the association of anti-Semitism with opposition to the EU between the 1999 survey and other surveys. We again see that anti-Semitism was associated with low EU confidence only in the 1999 wave.

Exploring the Mechanisms of Persistence

The mechanisms responsible for the long-term persistence of out-group hostility are best studied by surveying attitudes across several generations ((Peisakhin 2013)). Because of data limitations, here I instead draw on the previous studies of anti-Semitism in Poland and elsewhere to illustrate how these mechanisms may operate.

Generational Transmission: Family and Community Influence

Why has anti-Semitism persisted in the absence of Jews? Immediate family plays perhaps the most important role in the perpetuation of prejudice. Metaanalysis of the past 60 years of research by Degner and Dalege (2013) confirms that children's and their parents' out-group attitudes share significant similarities, which researchers have attributed to intergenerational transmission of ideology rather than to the similarity in background or psychological characteristics (e.g., Duriez and Soenens 2009).

[18]Education levels were measured only in the 1999 and 2008 waves.

Table 6: **The Association of Anti-Semitism and EU Confidence in EVS Survey Waves (1990, 1999, 2008).**

	1990 EVS	1999 EVS	2008 EVS	1990-2008 EVS	1999-2008 EVS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
No Jewish neighbors	**0.250**	**0.752*****	**−0.059**	**0.124**	**−0.088**
	(0.355)	**(0.251)**	**(0.346)**	**(0.231)**	**(0.326)**
Survey 1999				**0.192**	**0.258**
				(0.155)	**(0.190)**
I(Survey 1999 $*$ No Jews)				**0.541***	**0.796****
				(0.302)	**(0.381)**
No Muslim neighbors	0.112	−0.524*	−0.473	−0.320*	−0.480**
	(0.339)	(0.273)	(0.324)	(0.176)	(0.209)
Left–right ideology	0.015	−0.074*	−0.042	−0.054*	−0.061*
	(0.065)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Religiosity	0.662**	0.208	−0.031	0.309**	0.107
	(0.272)	(0.212)	(0.257)	(0.134)	(0.162)
Income: low	0.670*	−0.166	0.009	0.198	−0.073
	(0.363)	(0.305)	(0.299)	(0.176)	(0.210)
Income: medium	0.461	−0.432	−0.732**	−0.170	−0.536**
	(0.337)	(0.299)	(0.335)	(0.177)	(0.216)
Aged 30-49	0.532	0.562	0.238	0.436**	0.366
	(0.401)	(0.343)	(0.343)	(0.202)	(0.237)
Aged 50 and older	0.370	0.646*	0.382	0.501**	0.493**
	(0.414)	(0.351)	(0.340)	(0.204)	(0.238)
Under 20,000 residents	0.121	0.275	−0.012	0.132	0.143
	(0.257)	(0.213)	(0.246)	(0.131)	(0.159)
Education: middle		0.146	−0.859***		−0.251
		(0.231)	(0.289)		(0.185)
Education: upper		−0.327	−0.879**		−0.453*
		(0.330)	(0.408)		(0.253)
Constant	−3.314***	−1.955***	−1.312**	−2.379***	−1.865***
	(0.593)	(0.478)	(0.538)	(0.277)	(0.373)
Observations	585	827	950	2,367	1,777
Log Likelihood	−214.224	−336.811	−276.128	−848.562	−618.444
AIC	448.448	697.622	576.255	1,721.124	1,264.887

Logistic regression. The dependent variable is the lack of confidence in the EU (no confidence = 1). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Parents-to-children transmission of attitudes can be reinforced (or undermined) by the communities in which families are embedded (Peisakhin 2013). Voigtländer and Voth (2012a) demonstrate that communities not only moderate the generational transmission of prejudice but can also impart prejudice on newcomers. They find that second-generation immigrants have adopted perhaps the most unlikely trait – xenophobia – from their German surroundings.

The role of the family and community in the persistence of anti-Semitism has also been emphasized by Polish researchers. Bilewicz and Wojcik's (2009) study of anti-Semitic attitudes among schoolchildren in 15 former shtetls underscored the importance of parents' and grandparents' normative influence and concluded that manifestations of anti-Semitism by others (such as anti-Semitic graffiti) can negatively affect attitudes toward Jews.

Material Incentives

Generational transmission mechanisms can be reinforced by economic incentives (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2015). There is considerable evidence that material considerations contributed to the perpetuation of anti-Semitism in post-WWII Poland. As Jews were killed or transferred to ghettos and camps during the war, local Poles took advantage of the situation by expropriating Jewish property (Michlic-Coren 2000; Törnquist-Plewa 2006). The share of possessions acquired and the number of beneficiaries were roughly proportional to the size of the local Jewish population. After the war, anti-Semitic attitudes and violence acquired a new purpose – legitimizing the right to the Jewish property and ensuring that the Jewish survivors would emigrate and abandon restitution claims (Gross 2006).

Property motives have been used to explain the surge in anti-Semitic killings in the late 1940s as Jews returned home from concentration camps or from hiding. Engel (1998) finds written descriptions of 327 Jewish victims of 130 incidents in 102 locations between September 1944 and September 1946 alone.

Tokarska-Bakir (2012) chronicles the experience of a group of Holocaust survivors who after the war returned to Klimontów, a village that had counted 4,500 residents in 1939, 69% of them Jewish. Upon examining the records of home ownership from the 1950s, she finds that at least 125 properties

changed hands due to the combination of the Holocaust, the post-1945 murder of returning Jews, and the emigration of possible successors.

Törnquist-Plewa (2006), in turn, draws a link between expropriation motives and contemporary anti-Semitism. In her study of Szydłowiec, a town of 15,000 residents where Jews made up 75% of the pre-WWII inhabitants, she notes that some residents to this day worry that Jews will return to claim their property. She also shows that the older generation managed to transmit anti-Semitic prejudice to the local schoolchildren.

State Policies

Persistence of out-group hostility is not preordained in societies with violent intergroup histories. Studies demonstrate that state intervention can reduce out-group prejudice even within a short period of time (Dumitru 2011) and when the out-group is no longer present (Voigtländer and Voth 2012b). Of course, even well-intended state interventions can fail. In particular, U.S. and French heavy-handed denazification policies have proved counterproductive, while a different approach in the British- and Soviet-controlled territories succeeded (Voigtländer and Voth 2012b).

For most of the post-WWII period, the Polish state encouraged hostility toward the Jewish out-group. Even as the Jewish population was reduced to tens of thousands, the communist regime deployed anti-Semitic attacks to divert attention from the absence of political and economic reform. Perhaps the best-known example is the 1968 anti-Zionist campaign, used to reshuffle the Communist Party's leadership and weaken student protests. In the 1970s and 1980s, anti-Semitic rhetoric was directed against the Committee for the Defense of the Workers and the first Solidarity movement (Michlic 2006).

Jews remained the threatening other in post-1989 Poland, as the article demonstrates. As recently as in the 2015 presidential election, the "Jewish issue" resurfaced when candidate Andrzej Duda, of the Law and Justice Party, criticized the incumbent's apology for the massacre in Jedwabne as an attempt to undermine Poland's reputation. Ironically, the Polish far-right spread rumors that Duda himself had Jewish roots (Wroński 2015). Duda went on to win the presidency. His less popular

competitor, Grzegorz Braun, of the far-right, claimed that the Polish government sold state-owned forests to fulfill Jewish restitution demands.[19]

At the same time, some important steps toward reducing anti-Semitism have been taken. A growing number of Polish scholars study approaches toward combating anti-Semitism and addressing the difficult past. In 2013, the Center for Research on Prejudice at Warsaw University was invited to share its findings with the Polish parliament. Meetings of Polish and Israeli high-school students are organized, education curricula are rewritten, and programs such as the School of Dialogue seek to educate youth about the history of Jews in Poland. In 2014, the Museum of the History of Polish Jews, financed by the City of Warsaw and the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, opened its doors to visitors. The Polish Catholic Church, historically blamed for perpetuating hostility against Jews, has begun to encourage interfaith dialogue and criticized *Radio Maryja*'s and the LPR's attacks on Jews. Over time, these important initiatives are likely to dampen anti-Semitism and improve Polish–Jewish relations.

Discussion and Conclusion

In the 1940s, ethnic minorities that comprised over 30% of the Polish population were exterminated or expelled, making Poland one of the most homogeneous nation-states in Europe. However, group attitudes that were shaped by living in an ethnically diverse environment turned out to be much more persistent. Despite profound political and economic discontinuities, these attitudes were reproduced across generations and have continued to shape political preferences.

The article demonstrates an association between the size of the Jewish population before WWII and the level of support for EU membership in 2003 at the county level. I argue that local attitudes toward Jews served as a critical intervening variable between public opinion about EU membership and the anti-Semitic frames promulgated by Poland's populist political actors. Outgroup cues were effective among anti-Semitic voters, who are more prevalent in the areas that had a larger Jewish population in the pre-WWII period and where pogroms occurred in 1941.

[19]Braun's anti-Semitic statements from the campaign are available on his website, http://grzegorzbraun.pl

I attribute the persistence of anti-Semitism to a legacy of pre-WWII interethnic competition. The Polish state of the interwar period, as well as the three imperial powers that ruled Poland up to 1918, failed to integrate Jews and other ethnic minorities into the fabric of mainstream society. Unfortunately, anti-Semitism in Poland today is still influenced by the interethnic tensions of nearly a century ago.

Although the majority of work in political science focuses exclusively on contemporary explanatory variables, this article draws attention to the mechanisms through which historical legacies can shape modern politics. It speaks to the growing literature on long-run historical continuities. For example, Wittenberg (2006) finds that contemporary support for right-wing parties in Hungary is correlated with voting outcomes in the last presocialist democratic national parliamentary election. Peisakhin (2013) demonstrates that Ukrainians on different sides of the imperial border obliterated nearly a century ago still perceive Russia differently. Acharya et al. (2015) trace the origins of contemporary attitudes in the American South to the prevalence of slavery in 1860.

I contribute to this research by proposing a novel attitudinal mechanism through which historical legacies influence contemporary political outcomes. In particular, I emphasize the interaction between framing at the national level and historically determined attitudes at the local level. Even as the article points to the remarkable persistence of anti-Semitism in some geographic areas, it shows that the linkage between such attitudes and political behavior (in this case, support for EU accession) fluctuates over time. Latent predispositions rooted in the distant past come to matter in the present if and when instrumentalized by political entrepreneurs. As suggested by the scholarship on racialization in the United States, group-centric sentiments can influence preferences on a broad range of ostensibly unrelated issues, when political elites emphasize linkages between an out-group and a particular policy (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Tesler 2012).

Attitudinal legacies discussed in the article may in fact be more persistent than structural legacies, in part because they rely on generational transmission, a mechanism that lies largely outside of state control. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2014) conclude, for example, that across Poland's imperial partitions, the differences in income and education "were smoothed by economic forces and policy intervention" while the differences in religious practices and democratic beliefs have persisted.

The evidence presented here should be interpreted with caution. The article seeks to address endogeneity by including a number of historical control variables, employing the sequential g-estimation method, and supplementing statistical analyses at the individual, town, and county levels with qualitative evidence. Nonetheless, there is always a possibility that some omitted variable drives the association between the pro-EU vote and the pre-WWII share of the Jewish population. Furthermore, the economic variables used in the article may not be capturing the structural legacies of the Holocaust.

The findings raise intriguing questions for further research. In particular, more work is needed to understand how the mechanisms of transmission operate and what conditions are most conducive to the persistence of localized attitudes. Poland presents an interesting case for examining the processes of value transmission, as its western and northern regions witnessed nearly complete population replacement in the wake of WWII. A compelling question for future research is whether the resettlement process affected how particular attitudes and behaviors were reproduced across generations of Polish migrants.

References

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. 2001. "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation." *American Economic Review* 91: 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, D., T. A. Hassan, and J. A. Robinson. 2011. "Social structure and development: A legacy of the Holocaust in Russia." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126: 895-946.

Acharya, A., Blackwell M. Sen M. 2015. "Detecting direct effects and assessing alternative mechanisms." Working Paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Acharya, A., M. Blackwell, and M. Sen. 2015. "The political legacy of American slavery." Working Paper.

Appel, H., and J. Gould. 2000. "Identity politics and economic reform: Examining industry-state relations in the Czech and Slovak republics." *Europe-Asia Studies* 52: 111-131.

Bauer, Y. 2010. *The death of the shtetl*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Becker, S. O., K. Boeckh, C. Hainz, and L. Woesmann. 2011. "The Empire is dead, long live the Empire! Long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy." IZA Discussion Paper No. 5584.

Beichelt, T. 2004. "Euro-skepticism in the EU accession countries." *Comparative European Politics* 2: 29-50.

Bilewicz, M., and A. Wojcik. 2009. "Antysemityzm na gruzach sztetl. Stosunek polskiej młodzieży do Żydów w miastach i miasteczkach południowej i wschodniej Polski." In *Etniczność, pamięć, asymilacja. Wokół problemów zachowania tożsamości mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce*, ed. L. M. Nijakowski. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe.

Blalock, H. M. 1967. *Toward a theory of minority-group relations*. New York, NY: Wiley.

Brader, T., N. A. Valentino, and E. Suhay. 2008. "What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat." *American Journal of Political Science* 52: 959-978.

Carey, S., and J. Burton. 2004. "Research note: Influence of the press in shaping public opinion towards the European Union in Britain." *Political Studies* 52: 623-640.

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. 1997. "Żydzi i Polacy w opiniach społeczeństwa, Report nr BS/3/3/97."

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. 2000. "Aktualne Problemy i Wydarzenia (120). Dataset."

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. 2012. "Stosunek Polakow wobec innych narodów, Report nr BS/22/2012."

Chong, D., and J. N. Druckman. 2007. "Framing theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 103-126.

Conover, P. J. 1984. "The influence of group identifications on political perceptions and evaluations." *The Journal of Politics* 46: 760-785.

Corrsin, S. D. 1998. "Literacy rates and questions of language, faith, and ethnic identity in population censuses in the partitioned polish lands and interwar Poland (1880s-1930s)." *The Polish Review* 43: 131-160.

Darden, K. 2014. *Resisting occupation, Mass schooling and the creation of durable national loyalties.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Datner, H. 2012. "Współczesna spolecznoś̀ żydowska w Polsce a Zaglada." In *Następstwa zagłady Żydów. Polska 1944- 2010*, ed. F. Tych and M. Adamczyk-Garbowska. Zydowski Instytut Historyczny.

Degner, J., and J. Dalege. 2013. "The apple does not fall far from the tree, or does it? A meta-analysis of parent-child similarity in intergroup attitudes." *Psychological Bulletin* 139: 1270-1304.

Dumitru, D., Johnson C. 2011. "Constructing interethnic conflict and cooperation: Why some people harmed Jews and others helped them during the Holocaust in Romania." *World Politics* 63: 1-42.

Duriez, B., and B. Soenens. 2009. "The intergenerational transmission of racism: The role of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation." *Journal of Research in Personality* 43: 906-909.

Engel, D. 1998. "Patterns of anti-Jewish violence in Poland, 1944-1946." *Yad Vashem Studies* 26: 43-85.

Forecki, P. 2008. "Stolzman w Belwederze? Instrumentalizacja antysemityzmu w kampaniach prezydenckich w Polsce po roku 1989." *Srodkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne,* 1 (2): 157-184.

Gabel, M. J. 1998a. "Economic integration and mass politics: Market liberalization and public attitudes in the European Union." *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 936-953.

Gabel, M. J. 1998b. "Public support for European Integration: An empirical test of five theories." *The Journal of Politics* 60: 333-354.

Grosfeld, I., A. Rodnyansky, and E. Zhuravskaya. 2013. "Persistent anti-market culture: A legacy of the Pale of settlement and of the Holocaust." *American Economic Journal* 5 (3): 189-226.

Grosfeld, I., and E. Zhuravskaya. 2014. "Cultural vs. economic legacies of empires: Evidence from the partition of Poland." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 43: 55-75.

Gross, J. 2006. *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz: An essay in historical interpretation.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hagen, W. 1996. "Before the "final solution": Toward a comparative analysis of political anti-Semitism in interwar Germany and Poland." *The Journal of Modern History* 68: 351-381.

Haider-Markel, D., and M. Joslyn. 2001. "Gun policy, opinion, tragedy, and blame attribution: The conditional influence of issue frames." *The Journal of Politics* 63: 520-543.

Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2005. "Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration." *European Union Politics* 6: 419-443.

Hopkins, D. J. 2010. "Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 40-60.

Hurwitz, J., and M. Peffley. 2005. "Playing the race card in the post-Willie Horton era: The impact of racialized code words on support for punitive crime policy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69: 99-112.

Jasiewicz, K. 2004. "Knocking Europe's door: Voting behavior in the EU accession referendum in Poland." NCEEER Working paper.

Kinder, D., and L. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kitschelt, H., Z. Mansfledova, R. Markowski, and G. Toka. 1999. *Post-Communist party systems: Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kofta, M., and M. Bilewicz. 2011. "The demons of anti-Semitism: Jewish conspiracies: A simple explanation for complex issues." *Focus on Social Psychology* 2 (30): 28-31.

Kopstein, J., and J. Wittenberg. 2003. "Who voted communist? Reconsidering the social bases of radicalism in interwar Poland." *Slavic Review* 62: 87-109.

Kopstein, J., and J. Wittenberg. 2011. "Deadly communities: Local political milieus and the persecution of Jews in occupied Poland." *Comparative Political Studies* 44: 259-283.

Krzeminski, I. 2004. "Żydach i antysemityzme po 10 latach." In *Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukraine. Rabort z badań*, ed. I. Krzeminski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

McLauren, L. 2002. "Public support for the European Union: Cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?" *The Journal of Politics* 64: 551-566.

Michlic-Coren, J. 2000. "Anti-Jewish violence in Poland, 1918-1939 and 1945-1947." *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 13: 34-61.

Michlic, J. 2006. *Poland's threatening other: The image of the Jew from 1880 to the present.* Lincoln:

University of Nebraska Press.

Nelson, T., and D. Kinder. 1996. "Issue frames and group-centrism in American public opinion." *Journal of Politics* 58: 1055-1078.

Nelson, T., Z. Oxley, and R. Clawson. 1997. "Toward a psychology of framing effects." *Political Behavior* 19: 221-246.

Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej. 1989. "Stosunek do Niemców i Żydów w badaniach OBOP." http://www.tnsglobal.pl/archiwumraportow/ 1989/04/11/stosunek-do-niemcow-i-zydow-w-badaniach-obop-1975-1989.

Pankowski, R. 2010. *The populist radical right in Poland: The patriots*. London: Routledge.

Peisakhin, L. 2013. "Long run persistence of political attitudes and behavior: A focus on mechanisms." Paper presented at the 2013 CES Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Popkin, S. L. 1991. *The reasoning voter*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Scheve, K. F., and M. J. Slaughter. 2001. "What determines individual trade-policy preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54: 267-292.

Sherif, M., and C. W. Sherif. 1953. *Groups in harmony and tension: An integration of studies on intergroup relations*. New York: Harper.

Tajfel, H. 1970. "Experiments in intergroup discrimination." *Scientific American* 5 (223): 96-102.

Tajfel, H., C. Flament, M. Billig, and R. Bundy. 1971. "Social categorization and intergroup behavior." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1: 149-178.

Tesler, M. 2012. "The spillover of racialization into health care: How President Obama polarized public opinion by racial attitudes and race." *American Journal of Political Science* 56: 690-704.

Tokarska-Bakir, J. 2009. "Skaz antysemityzmu." *Teksty Drugie* 115: 302-317.

Tokarska-Bakir, J. 2012. "Następstwa Holokaustu w relacjach Żydowskich i w pamięci Polskiej prowincji w świetle badań etnograficznych." In *Następstwa zagłady Żydów. Polska 1944- 2010*, ed. F. Tych and M. Adamczyk-Garbowska. Lublin: Zydowski Instytut Historyczny.

Törnquist-Plewa, B. 2006. "Tale of Szydlowiec. Memory and oblivion in a former shtetl in Poland." In *The Holocaust on postwar battlefields. Genocide as historical culture.*, ed. K. G. Karlsson and U. Zander. Malmö-Lund: Sekel Förlag.

Tucker, J., A. Pacek, and A. J. Berinsky. 2002. "Transitional winners and losers: Attitudes toward EU membership in post-communist countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 557-571.

Voigtländer, N., and H.-J. Voth. 2012a. "Persecution perpetuated: The medieval origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127: 1339-1392.

Voigtländer, N., and H.-J. Voth. 2012b. "(Re-) Shaping hatred: Anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. 1890-2006." http://repositori.upf.edu/handle/ 10230/19868.

Winter, N. 2008. *Dangerous frames: How ideas about race and gender shape public opinion*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Wittenberg, J. 2006. *Crucibles of political loyalty: Church institutions and electoral continuity in Hungary*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolentarska-Ochman, E. 2006. "Collective remembrance in Jedwabne: Unsettled memory of World War II in Postcommunist Poland." *History and Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past* 18 (1-2): 152-178.

Wright, M., and J. Citrin. 2011. "Saved by the stars and stripes? Images of protest, salience of threat, and immigration attitudes." *American Politics Research* 39: 323-343.

Wroński, P. 2015. "Debata prezydencka." http://wyborcza.pl.

Appendix

Table A1: **Selected descriptive statistics for the 1931 counties.**

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
share of "Yes" votes (2003)	181	0.712	0.086	0.472	0.888
share of LPR votes (2001)	181	0.084	0.035	0.000	0.210
share Jewish (1931)	181	0.069	0.070	0.0003	0.430
share Catholic (1931)	181	0.837	0.145	0.163	0.986
share urban (1931)	181	0.273	0.258	0.000	1.000
share literate (1931)	181	0.600	0.116	0.305	0.844
share in agriculture (1931)	181	0.584	0.248	0.003	0.873
share unemployed (2002)	181	0.112	0.020	0.070	0.167
share in private sector (2002)	181	0.519	0.095	0.238	0.838
income tax per capita, Zl. (2002)	181	183.587	101.194	70.675	860.240

Table A2: **Alternative explanations. The association between the size of the pre-WWII Jewish population and (1) share of urban population (2002); (2) share of population in agriculture (2002); (3) log(personal income tax per capita (2002));[a] (4) share of the population with higher education (2002).[b]**

	Dependent variable:			
	share urban	share in agriculture	log(income tax)	log(share w/ higher edu)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
share Jewish	−0.108	0.011	−0.806	1.048**
	(0.233)	(0.056)	(0.538)	(0.496)
share Catholic	0.042	−0.012	0.226	0.258*
	(0.069)	(0.016)	(0.160)	(0.147)
share urban	0.247***	0.020	−0.055	0.503***
	(0.062)	(0.015)	(0.142)	(0.131)
share literate	−0.010	−0.003	1.040**	0.179
	(0.204)	(0.049)	(0.470)	(0.434)
share in agriculture	−0.658***	0.160***	−1.321***	−0.563***
	(0.071)	(0.017)	(0.164)	(0.151)
Austrian partition	−0.023	−0.054***	−0.029	0.096
	(0.031)	(0.007)	(0.071)	(0.065)
Prussian partition	−0.052	−0.015	−0.263*	−0.075
	(0.062)	(0.015)	(0.143)	(0.132)
log(population)	0.012	−0.005	0.198***	0.135***
	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Constant	0.652**	0.050	2.888***	−4.608***
	(0.282)	(0.067)	(0.650)	(0.599)
Observations	181	181	181	181
R^2	0.825	0.736	0.721	0.688
Adjusted R^2	0.816	0.723	0.708	0.673

Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

[a] This measure excludes corporate tax, in contrast to the tax variable in Table 3 in the article.

[b] The coefficient on share Jewish is significant in Model 4 and indicates that the presence of Jews before WWII is associated with greater education and thus higher human capital today, which contradicts the hypothesis on the negative structural legacies of the Holocaust.

Table A3: **Robustness checks for the association between the size of the pre-WWII Jewish population and (A) the proportion of the pro-EU vote in the 2003 referendum or (B) LPR vote in the 2001 parliamentary election. Models 1 and 3 exclude urban centers (Bialystok, Bielsko, Bydgoszcz, Czestochowa, Gdynia, Gniezno, Grudziadz, Inowroclaw, Krakow, Katowice, Krolewska Huta, Lublin, Poznan, Lodz, Sosnowiec, Torun, and Warszawa). Models 2 and 4 exclude counties that today host large numbers of Jewish tourists: Oswiecim (Auschwitz); Ostrow (Treblinka), Lublin (Majdanek); Tomaszow (Belzec); Wlodawa (Sobibor); Warsaw; Krakow.**

	Dependent variable:			
	pro-EU vote		anti-Semitic vote	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
share Jewish	-0.730^{***}	-0.359^{***}	0.344^{***}	0.252^{***}
	(0.183)	(0.126)	(0.091)	(0.065)
share Catholic	-0.089^{**}	-0.085^{**}	0.050^{***}	0.052^{***}
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.019)
share urban		-0.002		0.017
		(0.032)		(0.017)
share literate	-0.091	-0.004	0.050	0.017
	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.058)	(0.057)
share in agriculture	-0.314^{***}	-0.282^{***}	0.075^{***}	0.069^{***}
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Austrian partition	0.059^{***}	0.057^{***}	0.050^{***}	0.053^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Prussian partition	0.011	0.019	0.017	0.016
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.017)
log(population)	0.017	0.015	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	0.869^{***}	0.786^{***}	-0.051	0.002
	(0.199)	(0.163)	(0.100)	(0.085)
Observations	163	174	163	174
R^2	0.601	0.657	0.466	0.453
Adjusted R^2	0.583	0.641	0.442	0.427

Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. Standard errors are given in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$