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Influence of Decisionmakers' National Identity Conceptions on the Dynamics of Denuclearization of Ukraine and Belarus

Introduction

In November 1996, the last Soviet nuclear warheads were withdrawn from Belarus, ensuring non-nuclear status of the three former Soviet republics - Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the only states, besides South Africa, to have given up fully developed nuclear arsenals.

Although all three states disarmed by 1996, their paths to denuclearization were very different. It is especially interesting to compare the dynamics of compliance and disarmament in Belarus and Ukraine, whose destinies have been intertwined throughout history and whose similarities led social scientists to call them sisters. The republics shared anti-nuclear consensus prior to independence. In July 1990, before the dissolution of the USSR (and thus the official increase of nuclear powers by three) shocked the western world, the third and the eighth nuclear powers had voluntarily pledged nonnuclear status in their declarations of independence. Before the Russians and Americans started employing sticks and carrots to prod the newly independent states along the denuclearization path, Ukraine and Belarus had vowed to relinquish the weapons. They reasserted their commitment to nonnuclear status on multiple occasions.

Dutiful Belarus continued to trudge along the disarmament path once the euphoria over independence passed. Having endorsed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from the outset, Belarus signed the Lisbon Agreement in May 1992 and followed through with formal accession to the NPT in July 1993. It was proud to have been the first former Soviet state to join the regime¹ and celebrated the removal of weapons with pomp.² Compensation for the

removed weapons was never on top of its agenda although it was eventually rewarded for compliance.

By contrast, Ukraine's hesitant nuclear compliance and frequent suspension of the transfer process gave Russian and American policymakers many reasons to worry. In 1992, Kiev took ownership of the Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory, claiming that the Soviet deterrent was created with resources of many republics and therefore belonged to all of them. The Ukrainian Rada deputies repeatedly rejected Ukraine's membership in the NPT, kept demanding greater security guarantees and greater compensation from Russia and the West, and went as far as threatening to retain the weapons or even sell them to the highest bidder³. Ukraine placed after-the fact conditions on the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, which committed the country along with Belarus and Kazakhstan to nonnuclear status "in the shortest possible time,"⁴ and renounced freshly concluded Massandra Accords, which, among other things, reaffirmed its nonnuclear status⁵. The problems were solved only in 1994. After Ukraine signed the Trilateral Agreement with Russia and the United States, the denuclearization process proceeded with no more disruptions. In the end, the "problem child" was handsomely rewarded. As Mitchell Reiss notes, "For weapons that Ukraine did not control and had not built, it received (twice) American, Russian, and British security assurances, one hundred tons of nuclear fuel, forgiveness of its multibillion-dollar oil and gas debt to Russia, and a commitment of \$900 million in U.S. financial assistance."⁶

Belarus and Ukraine have much in common. Both unexpectedly obtained independence in 1991; both exist under the same geopolitical factors and are founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); both have significant Russian minorities and share borders with hegemonic nuclear-armed Russia; both have reservations about nuclear power after Chernobyl reactor accident; both wound up transferring nuclear arsenals to Russia.

The need to relinquish their nuclear arsenals could have brought the two even closer together; they could have cooperated on the issue winning higher compensation and more security guarantees from bargaining with the United States and Russia. Belarus, however, did not support Ukraine's position and only shared in the results.⁷ At the same time, Ukraine was the first to support Belarus' initiative to create a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe, introduced by Belarusian Minister for Foreign Affairs Uladzimir Siianko at the NPT extension conference in 1995.⁸

What could account for these significant disparities in the countries' behavior during the negotiation and implementation of their nuclear dismantlement? I attempt to answer these questions employing Jacques Hymans' theory that a leader's nuclear proliferation decisions stem from his/her national identity conception,⁹ or the understanding of what the nation stands for and how high it naturally stands. The paper is organized as follows: first, I explain the weaknesses of applying prevailing theories to the Belarusian and Ukrainian case; next, I present my hypothesis; then, I explain the theory proposed by Hymans and apply it to analyze the national identity conceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian decisionmakers, drawing from the press and secondary literature to match hypothesis to the conclusion; then I examine the details of the process of denuclearization in Ukraine and Belarus; finally, I conclude with implications of the study on the mechanisms of nuclear reversal.

Problems with Other Theories

According to realists, states are functionally alike¹⁰ and their identities are insignificant. If the states are "distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks,"¹¹ as realism suggests, then the processes of denuclearization should have been relatively similar in Ukraine and Belarus. But even if one accepts that Ukraine has had more leverage in disarmament negotiations because of its greater size and bigger arsenal, the

experience of other post-Soviet states shows that smaller capabilities do not automatically translate into smaller claims (although they certainly reduce the likelihood of success). For example, weak Georgia refused to join the CIS, demanded withdrawal of the Soviet troops, and claimed a part of the Black Sea Fleet.¹² Likewise, small Baltic states were unequivocal in breaking their ties with Russia and succeeded. A founding member of the UN, the world's eighth nuclear power and the most militarized Soviet Republic,¹³ Belarus had greater capabilities than most of the Soviet states. However, it adopted a timid stance in negotiations with the superpowers.

Glenn Snyder identifies threat as a function of the degree of conflict, the likelihood of the conflict being resolved by force, and the relative military capability of the state and its adversary.¹⁴ According to this definition, Ukraine did face a greater threat as its relations with Russia deteriorated. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had interest in the Black Sea Fleet, and Russian parliamentarians supported the secession of the Ukrainian Crimea peninsula. However, the nuclear issue was resolved before the geopolitical situation changed. In fact, the turnaround in Ukrainian policies occurred in 1994, when the catastrophic economic situation and election of Russian nationalists to the Duma¹⁵ made Russia's potential threat all the more frightening.

Realism does account for Ukraine's choice to align with the west, which seemed less threatening to Ukrainian sovereignty and more rewarding financially.¹⁶ However, it cannot explain why Ukraine has been inattentive to American demands to denuclearize and join the NPT at the most pro-western stage in its development before pro-Russian president Leonid Kuchma was elected in 1994.

The normative approach stresses the importance of the Nonproliferation Treaty concluded in 1968. A country that does not adhere to the NPT falls into the unsavory category

of 'rogue' states. Although the NPT norms apply equally to Belarus and Ukraine, it is Ukraine (with five nuclear plants on its territory) who would benefit more from the access to markets for peaceful nuclear use, guaranteed in the Article 4 of the NPT¹⁷. Moreover, given its assertions of Europeanness and pro-western orientation, Ukraine should have been more enthusiastic than its northern neighbor about participating in the norms and international regimes championed by the west to gain international recognition and prestige. Finally, because their nuclear-free status preceded the NPT regime, both Ukraine and Belarus had an equal right to argue for their right to retain the arsenals, but even the Ukrainian nationalists who supported retaining nuclear weapons, never used this argument to justify their position.

Ukrainian resistance also frustrates the explanation suggested by the liberal identity school of thought. According to this theory, states are likely to cooperate with those states whose values they share or want to associate with. Indeed, Ukraine took the trouble to assert its Europeanness, applied for admittance into prestigious western institutions, and even undertook an economic reform, however modest. Belarus, on the other hand, shied reforms, united with Russia to recreate the asymmetry of the relationship with Moscow that lasted throughout the Soviet Union, and ignored western demands to honor human rights. One would expect Ukraine to lead the disarmament efforts and honor international treaties. But in reality, it was the undemocratic and conservative Minsk that showed the way to the west-oriented and reform-minded Kiev.

Domestic pressure school of thought would explain Ukrainian hesitance as a tug of war between the communist and pro-Russian forces, who wanted to surrender the arsenals to Moscow, and the nationalist opposition, who viewed Russia as a threat and needed security guarantees from the United States. Indeed, most breaks in the disarmament negotiations were caused by the disputes in the opposition-dominated Ukrainian Rada, and most objections were

voiced by the opposition deputies. Moreover, Ukrainian political opposition was much more numerous and unified than its Belarusian counterpart, which explains the striking uniformity on the issue of denuclearization in the Belarusian Supreme Soviet. I use this approach as well as the theory outlined in Jacques Hymans book “The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation” to explain why Ukraine was resistant to western demands to denuclearize until 1994 and why Belarus did not follow the suite.

The Argument

I argue that Belarusian and Ukrainian dynamics of nuclear disarmament can be explained by the national identity conceptions (NICs) of their decisionmakers. Jacques Hymans defined NIC as “an individual’s understanding of the nation’s identity – his or her sense of *what the nation naturally stands for* and *how high it naturally stands*, in comparison to others in the international arena.”¹⁸ According to Hymans, only leaders who possess oppositional nationalist NICs decide to obtain nuclear weapons. The other possible NICs - oppositional subaltern, sportsmanlike nationalist, and sportsmanlike subaltern – are not conducive to building the bomb, but lead to distinct nuclear proliferation policies.

Hymans’ theory focuses on the NIC of the head of state.¹⁹ Although the head of state “dominated negotiations” and “largely determined the contours of the final deal,” the parliaments of Belarus and Ukraine needed to approve it.²⁰ The Ukrainian Rada constantly stalled denuclearization process refusing to ratify international agreements. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the NICs of Belarusian and Ukrainian heads of state, I also examine the NICs of Belarusian and Ukrainian parliamentarians, who usually identified with one of the main contesting parties - the Communist Party or the Popular Front. I argue that the oppositional nationalism of the Ukrainian deputies, who represented the opposition and occupied 25 percent of seats in the parliament, accounted for the Ukraine’s recalcitrance on the

nuclear issue. By contrast, representation of the Belarusian opposition in the Supreme Soviet went from 10 percent in 1990 to no seats in 1995. Sportsmanlike subaltern NICs of the majority of left Belarusian parliamentarians ensured the country's easy compliance with the international regime and following through with the denuclearization process. I also attribute Ukraine's ratification of the NPT in 1994 to the decrease of the number of oppositional deputies in the Rada to 14 percent and election of sportsmanlike nationalist President Leonid Kuchma in 1994, who replaced the oppositional nationalist, President Kravchuk.

National Identity Conception

Although in his book on leaders' NICs Hymans focuses on the decision to build the bomb, he suggests that a decisionmaker's NIC also affects ancillary nuclear decisions²¹. Giving up nuclear arsenal already in possession involves a more complex cost-benefit analysis than a decision to go nuclear, which, according to Hymans, is "made hastily, without the considerable vetting process."²² Admittedly, Belarusian and Ukrainian decisions to give up the nuclear arsenals were less revolutionary, but I argue that they were inspired by the same emotions - fear and pride - that would urge an oppositional nationalist to build the bomb²³.

The turbulent years following the dissolution of the Soviet empire suggest relevance of some of the five decisional settings, which Ole Holsti found to increase the valence of a decisionmaker's beliefs²⁴ (Hymans used the same concept to evaluate the decision to go nuclear²⁵). First, the coup of August 1991 was a highly ambiguous event; it was far from certain that Russia was the sole formal successor of the Soviet Union, and Ukraine repeatedly contested this ambitious claim²⁶. Second, independence was a unique experience for both Ukraine and Belarus, and their decisionmakers had no precedent to follow as they searched for identity²⁷ after centuries of Russification and Polonisation; they had no independent past to look back to. Third, the political system inherited by the two republics was far more centralized

than a typical western system, and the head leaders had relative freedom.²⁸ Both countries had unicameral parliaments²⁹ that ratified important international treaties, but the political process in Ukraine was more open³⁰. Fourth, the coup of August 1991 and the dissolution of the armed-to-the-teeth Soviet Union was anticipated by neither Minsk nor Kiev, which greatly increased the states' insecurity and stimulated the need for formulating a collective identity³¹. Fifth, a high degree of uncertainty was involved. The future of the newly independent countries was much more uncertain than it had ever been in the Soviet era, and the uncertainties of the nuclear arsenal coincided with the uncertainties of nation building. Moreover, both countries lacked experience of independently negotiating with the United States; therefore, neither knew what to expect, how far to go, or what buttons to push. Because the situation fits the five decisional settings specified by Ole Holsti, I conclude that the turbulent political scene in Ukraine and Belarus demanded decisions that would rely on beliefs rather than calculations, increasing the influence of NICs on policy choices.

NICs of Belarusian and Ukrainian decisionmakers

I will now proceed to compare Belarusian and Ukrainian actors on the two dimensions of solidarity and status, proposed by Hymans. In Belarus, the political stage was divided between the opposition (Belarusian People's Front (BPF) and the government (including Chairmen of the Supreme Soviet Mikalay Dzyemyantsyey (replaced for siding with August 1991 coup), Soviet Stanislau Shushkevich (1991-1993), and Myacheslau Hrib (1993-1996); Prime Minister Vyacheslau Kebich (1991-1994), and President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (1994-now)). In Ukraine, the political spectrum was split between opposition (the Rukh) and the government (including Leonid Kravchuk (Chairman of Verkhovna Rada (1990-1991), President of Ukraine (1991-1994)), and Leonid Kuchma (Prime Minister (1992-1993), President (1994-2005)).

Because of the Soviet past and the lack of independent experience in the international system the two countries' pictures of the world were still largely dichotomized. Enormous Russia was on one side, and the western world represented by the NATO – on the other. Confusingly enough, the pressure to denuclearize was coming from the east and the west at the same time, and their former common enemy the United States wanted the nuclear weapons transferred to its own former enemy, Russia. Hymans described the NIC as a reflection of the ongoing “self-other comparison” using the notion of “key comparison other³²”. I argue that the opposition in both Ukraine and Belarus viewed Russia as their “key comparison other”, and that by 1996 NATO and the West in general, having funded the opposition, pressured for economic reforms, and criticized President Lukashenka³³, emerged as “the key comparison other” for the Belarusian head of state.

Solidarity: sportsmanlike or oppositional NIC

One dimension of self-other comparison is solidarity. Solidarity establishes whether the nation and its “key comparison other” stand for similar or opposite values³⁴. The former illustrates sportsmanlike and the latter - oppositional consciousness, which reflects belief that “their” values conflict with “ours”³⁵.

Existence within wider, “transcendent” identity groupings decreases the likelihood of the oppositional NIC³⁶. The history of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia was conducive to formation of a transcendent Slavic identity: all three trace their origins to Kievan Rus³⁷, the first Slavic state, and for the most part have been one state since the partition of Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1794³⁸. However, not all parts of Belarus and Ukraine joined Russia at the same time: Western Ukraine was once ruled by Austrian empire and vast territories of both Ukraine and Belarus were once occupied by Poland³⁹. Moreover, neither land became a part of the Russian Empire by choice: partition of 1794 resulted from aggressive actions of Russia,

Prussia and Hungary, and although territories of Belarus and Ukraine were absent from the official title of the state that encompassed them in 16-18th centuries, Russia was still viewed as an aggressor. The unflattering image of Russia was reinforced when the Bolsheviks crushed Belarusian National Republic (BNR) nine months after its independence in 1918⁴⁰. As a result, in early 90s Belarusians and Ukrainians were split in their views on Russia. If pro-Russian government glorified the centuries under the Russian wing and victory over western aggressors in 1945, the opposition recalled NKVD executions and Chernobyl. This antagonism is also evident in national holidays: while the official Independence Day of Belarus is July 3rd, when capital Minsk was liberated in WWII, the Belarusian opposition celebrates March 25, when the independent Belarusian Popular Republic was founded in 1918.⁴¹

The first alternative to the Communist Party –“the Popular Front⁴²” – was formed in both Belarus and Ukraine only in 1989, following the example of the Baltic states.⁴³ The anticommunist opposition was fused with nationalism, and Russia and then the Soviet Union were seen as enemies of both the nation and the national idea. The official objective of BPF is “the attainment of democracy and independence through national rebirth and rebirth of civil society, which was destroyed by communism and foreign occupation.”⁴⁴ For BPF, foreign occupiers are undoubtedly Russians, who are to blame for the “terrible state” of Belarusian culture “after about 200 years of colonialism and Russification.”⁴⁵ The party program of Rukh similarly states: “The foreign-political situation in Ukraine is complicated by the fact that it has common borders with Russia, a country that has not yet made its choice between democratic or imperial development”.⁴⁶ Dymitri Pavlychko, the Chairman of the Rada’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Rukh, called Russia’s military presence in Sevastopol “a hammer ready to strike at any moment [Ukraine’s] independence.”⁴⁷ Rukh’s wariness toward hegemonic Russia led it to adopt a “Concept Paper on National Security” - the first of its kind in Ukraine⁴⁸.

Thus, on the dimension of solidarity the Rukh and BPF were clearly oppositional toward Russia and invested great energy to attract the Russified electorate, who would pledge allegiance to the side that guaranteed the stable economy. The similarity of the Slav national cultures after the two centuries of common history and internationalism of the Soviet Union undermined their claims to independent statehood and made compromising with Russia as acceptance of the opposition's weakness, which translated into recalcitrance in disarmament negotiations and demands for greater security guarantees, which came predominantly from the opposition.⁴⁹ The opposition's belief that the Ukrainians are a different people from the Russians and therefore should have a state of their own⁵⁰ reinforced their opinion that Ukraine should not be sidestepped in negotiating weapons owned by Ukraine, stationed on its territory and thus crucial its security.

Surprisingly, Supreme Soviet Chairman and later President Kravchuk, shared the opposition's wariness toward Russia. "Once an implacable enemy of Rukh," he headed a national communist fraction within the Rada supporting a Ukrainian sovereignty and independence in 1990.⁵¹ After the weapons transfer was suspended in 1992, the "sovereignty communist"⁵² Kravchuk complained that "previously Ukraine was viewed through a prism of U.S. policy toward Russia" and stressed Ukraine's need in security guarantees "in situations when our neighbors such as Russia present territorial claims."⁵³ When Kravchuk was running against Kuchma in 1994 presidential elections, Kuchma successfully portrayed him as a nationalist.⁵⁴

Although Kravchuk and some newly converted independence advocates mistrusted Russia's ambitions, the nationalist movement failed to capture the state⁵⁵ (and, by definition, the Communist Party), and the members of left parties⁵⁶ tended to be sportsmanlike toward Russia. According to its mandate, the Ukrainian Communist Party is "strongly against the use

of military force in internal conflicts and condemns attempts [...] to incite them against [...] Russia and other friendly countries and natural allies.”⁵⁷ President Kuchma, former Communist Party member, was determined to change Ukraine’s political course from “self-isolation” to “restoring all mutually beneficial economic, spiritual and cultural ties with the former Soviet republics, and first of all with Russia.”⁵⁸ Chafetz observed that “the greater the perceived similarity between the source and the recipient of messages, the more likely the recipient is to believe and give weight to the message.”⁵⁹ Sportsmanlike consciousness of Ukrainian presidents made cooperation with Russia on disarmament easier; it also explains their reluctance to join the CIS security arrangements: they saw no security need, as Hymans anticipated⁶⁰.

In 1994, Belarus elected its first President, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who possessed oppositional nationalist NIC against NATO. Fearing NATO expansion, Lukashenka actively sought to enhance Belarusian security in the union with the Russian Federation, suspended the transfer of nuclear weapons in 1995 and questioned the nonnuclear future of Belarus in January 1996, when he stated that NATO action may force Belarus to redeploy nuclear weapons.⁶¹

Status: nationalist or subaltern NIC.

Another dimension Hymans uses to describe the NIC is status - the decisionmaker’s perception of how high his nation stands relative to its “key comparison other.”⁶² The “nationalist” NIC gives rise to “the sense that the nation can hold its head high.”⁶³ The “subaltern” NIC accounts for the “negative national self-image that in many cases is an internationalization of the image ascribed to their nation by the dominant powers.”⁶⁴ Perception of status stems from a nation’s political history,⁶⁵ and for both Ukraine and Belarus history consisted of war, occupation, repressions, Polonisation, and Russification. For Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians have remained White and Little Russians, respectively, even after

their independence from the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ However, a decisionmaker's consciousness need not be a rational assessment of the state's past. The same historic reality produces leaders with both nationalist and subaltern NICs. If for Belarusian leader Shushkevich "Belarusians have learned humility from their history,"⁶⁷ the Ukrainian leaders focused on the future of Ukraine as "a nation of 52 million, with a territory the size of France, with the third-largest nuclear force in the world."⁶⁸

Opposition in both countries clearly possessed nationalist NICs, which were consistent with their struggle for independence, western orientation, and self-confident posture in negotiations on disarmament. A nation-state's right to sovereignty is a western concept, it justifies nationalist ideology and implies that all states are equally legitimate and deserve an equal share of respect.⁶⁹ Nationalistic NICs prevailed in the Ukrainian government, which prevented it from advocating closer ties with Russia, and led to overestimation of the capabilities of Ukrainian economy.⁷⁰ If Belarusian communists supported restoration of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian communists formed group "For the Rada's sovereign Ukraine"⁷¹ as early as 1990⁷². The nationalist NICs of the Ukrainian decisionmakers explain why the superpowers' initially heavy-handed approach was counterproductive. The results of such approach are best summarized by Kravchuk's assertion that the superpowers did not appreciate that "the third largest nuclear power [Ukraine] [was] voluntarily rejecting all this [nuclear weapons]."⁷³ Most Ukrainians shared this view; Ukrainian minister of environment Kostenko, who participated in disarmament negotiations with Russia, openly stated, "Ukraine is so firm, that can stand against anyone. Americans tried to pressure, but we reminded them of their place."⁷⁴ American insistence that disarmament precede recognition⁷⁵ increased Ukraine's stakes in negotiations and made easy compliance even more unlikely.

With the exception of the BPF members, Belarusian policymakers possessed subaltern

NICs. Maintaining good relations with Russia was their top priority and taking a tougher bargaining posture seemed inconceivable.⁷⁶ When asked if he was worried about the possibility of Russia exerting economic pressure on Belarus, Kebich spoke for the whole Belarusian government: "Of course we're worried. That's why we should behave ourselves! That's why we must behave very quietly!"⁷⁷ Sportsmanlike subaltern NICs were consistent with their active role in initiating the CIS agreement and advocating a Nuclear-Free Zone in Eastern and Central Europe; which, according to Hymans, provides sportsmanlike subaltern decisionmakers with "certain rights that are perhaps incommensurate with their perceived material power potential."⁷⁸ Subaltern consciousness of the government showed in the Belarusian response to the Chernobyl catastrophe: "virtually every significant attempt to deal with the effects of Chernobyl has emanated from organizations or individuals who can be equated with the political opposition,"⁷⁹ but the government deemed the tragedy as impossible to overcome without the aid of Moscow.⁸⁰

Decisionmaker's Priorities

Although the NICs of Belarusian and Ukrainian leaders shed light at their disarmament decisions, I argue that it is also necessary to consider their priorities, which varied with time. According to Chafetz, the need to defend one's identity varies with external circumstances, and objective changes can alter identities and reorder priorities.⁸¹ As the environment changes, political independence may dominate economic concerns, and national security may eclipse the need for recognition in a decisionmaker's mind.⁸² Moreover, the need to be reelected may affect legislators' voting behavior overshadowing "ideological or policy-based motivations."⁸³

A reordering of priorities explains why before formal independence was achieved, the opposition in both countries denied nuclear weapons as symbols of Russian oppression and Chernobyl tragedy. First of all, the slightest hint that a satellite was considering retaining

nuclear arsenal before 1991 would have alarmed Russia jeopardizing possible independence. Second, anti-nuclear protests were an efficient way to win a national audience and dissent without openly challenging Moscow.⁸⁴ Third, the non-nuclear status distinguished the newly independent states from the Soviet Union.⁸⁵ Finally, denuclearization was the best strategy to obtain Western assistance and diplomatic recognition, which the opposition needed to secure independence. However, once atomic power “no longer represented Moscow’s dominance but Ukraine’s potential to sustain itself as an independent and self-sufficient country,” moratorium on its use was overturned by the Ukrainian Rada.⁸⁶ After independence was achieved and excitement was over, the practical problem of securing sovereignty – in the midst of economic crisis, Russia’s claims on Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, and western refusal to recognize the new state before denuclearization or provide security guarantees higher than those offered by the NPT⁸⁷ – became the top priority.

Different priorities as well as different NICs of Belarusian and Ukrainian leaders show in their Declarations of State Sovereignty.⁸⁸ The Declarations were issued by the national parliaments, and their content reflected the priorities guiding Belarusian Supreme Soviet and Ukrainian Rada in 1990. The documents are similar in structure and in language, which makes the comparison especially interesting. Belarusian subaltern consciousness is evident in Art. 6, which states that “all questions concerning [Belarusian] borders shall be decided only on the basis of the mutual consent of the Republic of Belarus and the adjacent sovereign states.” In contrast, Ukrainian Declaration states: “The Ukrainian SSR is independent in determining the administrative and territorial system of the Republic and the procedures for establishing national and administrative units.”⁸⁹ Ukrainian nationalism shows in Article 8 on cultural development, which focuses on the “national and cultural *recovery of the Ukrainian nation*” admitting that the Soviet conditions were detrimental to Ukrainian culture. The Ukrainian

Declaration contains a lengthy article on International Relations, in which Ukrainians stress their equality with other nations: Ukraine “acts as an equal participant in international affairs [...] and directly participates in the general European process and European structures.”⁹⁰

Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot compare Belarusian and Ukrainian role conceptions in the article “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” and results of their analysis are helpful in speculating on the NICs of Belarusian and Ukrainian decisionmakers. For example, the noted Ukrainian tendency toward the anti-imperialism speaks to its leaders’ nationalist desire to remain independent from Russia.⁹¹ Ukrainian leaders also scored higher than Belarusian leaders on regional leadership,⁹² which speaks to their belief in Ukraine’s respectable position in Europe and vis-à-vis Russia. Belarus, on the other hand, scored highest in the role mediator-integrator,⁹³ which indicates the sportsmanlike NICs of its leaders. The researchers also determined role models of Belarusian and Ukrainian leaders. Belarus, in agreement with the predominantly sportsmanlike subaltern NICs of its decisionmakers, adopted the role models of “international good citizens” - Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and other small European states.⁹⁴ By contrast, Ukraine leaders looked up to Russia and France⁹⁵ – both assertive nuclear powers that have the privilege to disagree with the rest of the international community.

Election results:

Having explored the NICs of major political actors, I will now look at changes in leadership that occurred between the year 1990, when the nonnuclear status was enshrined in the states’ Declarations of State Sovereignty, and 1996, when the last warheads were removed from the territories of Belarus and Ukraine.

In two rounds of elections to the Supreme Soviet of Belarus on March 4, 1990, and April 22, 1990, the *oppositional nationalist* BPF took 27 seats, or less than 10 percent of the

total. Due to siding with the August 1991 coup, chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet Dzyemyantsyey was replaced by *sportsmanlike nationalist* Shushkevich (1991-1993). There was no power struggle between the Belarusian Supreme Soviet and the government, which complicated passing international agreements in Ukraine because the head of state was, in effect, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.⁹⁶

The Ukrainian Rukh was luckier: it captured a quarter of seats in March 1990 elections. By July 1990, the number of opposition in the Rada rose to 125 (a third of the legislature) and they formed a Group of People's Rada Ukrainian communists supported independence and formed 239-member group For the Rada's Sovereign Ukraine. Although Rukh's candidate Vyacheslav Chornovil did not win in the presidential elections on December 1, 1991, felt "empowered" during the presidency of Kravchuk, who also was *oppositional* toward Russia.⁹⁷ The opposition controlled key committees in Rada and was especially strong when the communist party was banned (1991 -1993).⁹⁸

By mid-90s, the political awakening waned and economic problems came to the fore, which decreased the popularity of the opposition (by then Rukh and BPF were joined by other right parties). In 1994, Kebich and Lukashenka contested Belarusian elections arguing of who opposed the dissolution of the USSR most and who will be better at securing a union with Russia.⁹⁹ Lukashenka (*with an oppositional NIC toward NATO*) was elected the President of Belarus. BPF did not get a single seat in the Belarusian Parliament in 1995.¹⁰⁰ BPF's fiasco may be explained by its failure to cooperate with the Communists,¹⁰¹ as well as the weak nature of national identity and commitment to sovereignty among Belarusian people.¹⁰²

In Ukraine, Rukh and other national-democratic parties took only 14% of seats in the Rada elected in spring 1994¹⁰³. The left took 37 percent of seats, most of which went to the Communist Party.¹⁰⁴ Another 8 percent went to Centrist parties, and 40 percent was taken by

independents (who mostly represented the left).¹⁰⁵ The Ukrainian Communist Party and other leftist parties controlled the Rada committees on national security and foreign affairs.¹⁰⁶ The change in the composition of Rada was compounded by the election of pro-Russian president Leonid Kuchma in July 1994.

Denuclearization Process in Ukraine and Belarus

Ukraine's actions in 1993 are typically interpreted as an attempt to keep the nuclear weapons that was masterfully countered by the American sticks and carrots.¹⁰⁷ I show that American and Russian pressure only spurred Ukrainian resistance, and that Ukraine's eventual accession to the NPT occurred because of the changes in the composition of the Rada elected in 1994 and the succession of oppositional nationalist Kravchuk with sportsmanlike nationalist president Kuchma.

Belarus and Ukraine in the Romantic Period of Independence

In the so-called "romantic" period of independence, before any pressure was exerted or compensation offered, both Ukraine and Belarus renounced the Soviet nuclear arsenals and could not wait to get rid of them. Nonnuclear status was enshrined in their Declarations of Sovereignty in July 1990.¹⁰⁸ Upon declaring independence in August 1991, Ukraine and Belarus reaffirmed their nonnuclear status in October 1991, on December 8, 1991, and on December 30, 1991.¹⁰⁹ By the end of 1991, Ukraine's Foreign minister Zlenko produced a "Summary of Measures Proposed for the Protection of the National Interests of Ukraine" which reasserted the commitment to denuclearization and stated that control over nuclear weapons should be transferred to the joint command of the four nuclear states. This conformed to CIS Agreement of 21 December 1991 on joint measures with respect to nuclear weapons, which placed the nuclear weapons under the CIS Joint Armed Forces. The Agreement also

committed the states to the removal of tactical weapons from all three states to Russia by July 1, 1992.¹¹⁰

The unequivocal compliance of both states in 1990-91 was possible because the nonnuclear status was consistent with the NICs of major Belarusian and Russian decisionmakers: with the sportsmanlike nationalism of the Ukrainian left, who sympathized with Russia and saw no threat; with the sportsmanlike subaltern NICs of Belarusian left, who believed Belarus was too weak to demand greater compensation for its nuclear weapons and whose transcendent identity with Russia resolved possible doubts about transferring the weapons; with the oppositional nationalism of Rukh and BPF, whose primary concern was to secure legal independence from the Soviet Union and prepare a benevolent international environment for the task of nation-building.

After the formal independence was achieved, the practical problem of securing sovereignty became the top priority, and the denuclearization paths of Belarus and Ukraine diverged. Independence provided a boost of nationalism in both states, but the only the Ukrainian Rukh secured strong power in the parliament due to the fact that the Communist Party was outlawed and its members demoralized during the first years of independence.¹¹¹ The oppositional nationalist NICs of the Rukh and president Kravchuk, combined with predominantly sportsmanlike nationalist NICs of the Ukrainian left, made Rada more inclined to bargain for their weapons and even consider keeping them. These sentiments were reinforced by the US-Russian cooperation that made Ukraine feel excluded, as well as Russian encroachment on the Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian distrust of Russia was shared by the BPF, but Belarusian opposition had no weight in the Parliament for its objections to be realized in Belarusian policies. Some Ukrainian nationalists, driven by fear and pride, argued that Ukraine should become a nuclear-weapons power, and a significant number of sportsmanlike

nationalist Rada members, motivated by pride, criticized the government for giving away the tactical nuclear weapons for free. In Belarus, the subaltern parliament was unanimous on the need to comply with the regime; deputies with oppositional subaltern NICs perceived NATO as a threat and advocated alliance with Russia on security matters; deputies with sportsmanlike subaltern NICs felt no need to enter security alliances but agreed that Belarus was too weak to pursue independent economic policy.

Disarmament controlled by the Rada of the 1st Convocation and President Kravchuk

The first problems arose when the removal of tactical weapons was suspended on March 12, 1992: Kravchuk accused Moscow of blocking joint monitoring of the disarmament¹¹² and the Ukrainian Minister of Environment asked for security assurances on his visit to the White House.¹¹³ Nevertheless, after Kravchuk signed a decree establishing the administrative control over the nuclear weapons,¹¹⁴ the denuclearization process resumed. The removal of tactical was completed on May 6, 1992, nearly two months ahead of schedule.¹¹⁵ Strategic weapons still remained on the territory of Ukraine. On May 23, 1992, the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty was signed by the US and four nuclear CIS members, reaffirming Ukrainian and Belarusian intention to denuclearize within seven years.¹¹⁶

On July 2, 1993, the Rada adopted a resolution on the main guidelines of foreign policy, which stated that Ukraine was the owner of nuclear weapons on its territory inherited from the USSR. Why did Russia and Ukraine argue about the weapons that were to be removed and decommissioned and why was Ukraine satisfied with “negative control” of the weapons?¹¹⁷ Obtaining ownership and control were a question of pride: for oppositional nationalist Kravchuk Russian ownership “would mean the presence of occupying forces on the territory of Ukraine.”¹¹⁸

To come into force, the treaties signed by Kravchuk needed ratification of the Ukrainian parliament. The opposition in the Ukrainian Rada showed its mistrust of the former communist Kravchuk¹¹⁹ by voting against the international agreements he initiated.¹²⁰ Their efforts often succeeded because of their weight in the first Rada. For example, at Massandra in September 1993, Kravchuk agreed to surrender the nuclear weapons, forgo Ukraine's claim to the Black Sea Fleet, and return the remaining nuclear weapons to Russia within two years, but the deal collapsed after the protests of the Ukrainian opposition in the parliament.¹²¹

After the USA pledged \$155 million in economic aid, the Rada ratified START 1 on November 18, 1993, but attached thirteen conditions. Among other things, Rada disagreed with article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol that called for Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state "in the shortest possible time." The Rada again insisted on far-reaching security assurances, compensation for the fissile material from both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and Ukraine's right to monitor the elimination process.¹²² To delay the ratification even further, Ukraine demanded ratification of START I by all four nuclear states (including Belarus and Kazakhstan).¹²³ It was clear that the nationalist parliament would cooperate with the United States only to a degree that prevented Washington from leaving the bargaining table.

On February 3, 1994, the Rada ratified the Trilateral Agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States and removed the conditions previously placed on the Lisbon Protocol to START I. Many saw it as a breakthrough at the time, but at a closer look the Rada's behavior hasn't changed. First of all, on the same day the parliament again rejected the NPT.¹²⁴ Second, the Trilateral Agreement provided Ukraine with a reaffirmation of Russian and U.S. recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty and of financial assistance, while keeping the nuclear question intentionally vague, so the Rada had nothing to object.

The change of Ukrainian leadership and Ukraine's accession to the NPT

By summer 1994 independence romantics waned and Russia's punishment of Ukrainian recalcitrance by cutting off energy supplies¹²⁵ exacerbated Ukraine's economic crisis. Ukraine was becoming financially savor, but its nationalist posture never changed. In desperate need for money, Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovsky threatened to "auction off nuclear weapons to the highest bidder if no agreement could be reached"¹²⁶ instead of complying to receive whatever aid was promised by the west. Nevertheless, the problems led the Ukrainian decisionmakers to tame their nationalism and focus on solving the economic crisis. At the same time, the new Communist Party was established in 1993 to replace its banned predecessor and won significant support from the electorate with its promises of economic stability. The 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections changed the political composition of the Rada in favor of the deputies advocating closer ties to Russia. After pro-Russian President Kuchma was elected on July 19, 1994, decisionmakers with sportsmanlike nationalist NICs secured total control of the political agenda.¹²⁷

By November 1994 Ukraine had returned around 160 warheads and was thus far ahead of the withdrawal schedule established by the Trilateral Agreement. On November 16, 1994, the new Rada approved the accession of Ukraine to the NPT, voting 301 to 8 with 20 abstentions.¹²⁸ On December 5, 1994, Ukraine formally acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state at a ceremony at the CSCE conference in Budapest.¹²⁹ On June 5, 1996, the top defense officials of the United States, Russia and Ukraine celebrated the success of their nuclear disarmament efforts by scattering sunflower seeds.¹³⁰

Belarusian disarmament after 1992

American and Russian bullying did not make Belarus cling to its weapons. The same Communist leaders who had opposed independence in 1990 ruled the country after the collapse

of the Soviet Union. The initial surge of nationalism lasted long enough to obtain membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE now), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. However, the year 1992 marked a definitive break with Belarus' earlier commitments to sovereignty and neutrality. Sportsmanlike nationalist Shushkevich refused to sign a collective security agreement at the CIS summit in May 1992, but his sportsmanlike subaltern colleague prime minister Kebich ceded command of 30,000 Belarus-based strategic troops and signed a broad bilateral agreement creating a "common economic, political and social space" with Russia.¹³¹ By signing the Treaty on Cooperation in the Defense Sphere, Belarusian policymakers handed over the strategic nuclear weapons on their territory to Russia in July 1992.¹³² Belarus never raised the question of ownership or administrative control over the weapons, and at the height of the dispute over Ukraine's halting of the weapons transfer to Russia, Belarusian leaders reiterated their commitment to removal before the agreed international deadlines to draw a favorable comparison with Ukraine's intransigence.¹³³

The BPF deputies shared the concerns of their Ukrainian counterparts. For example, Deputy Pyotr Krauchanka wanted the nuclear weapons to be destroyed in Belarus (not by transferring them to Russia) and said the country deserved \$1.5 billion for the uranium from its strategic missiles.¹³⁴ Shushkevich disagreed, "Only Russia has the moral right to possess nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union."¹³⁵ Kebich replaced the assertive defense minister Pyotr Chaus, who believed that there was "no point being hasty to hand over nuclear weapons to anyone, whomever they are" and that "the presence of such a powerful weapon [... could] help Belarus to establish itself."¹³⁶

In November 1992, the Belarusian Parliament adopted a military doctrine calling for completing denuclearization within two and a half years instead of the generous seven years

allowed by the Lisbon Protocol. Belarus ratified the START I treaty on February 4, 1993 by a vote of 218 to 1, with 60 abstentions. The NPT was ratified on the following day.¹³⁷

Belarusian disarmament under President Lukashenka

The economic situation of Belarus was no better than that in Ukraine, but the subaltern NICs of Belarusian leaders prompted them a different survival tactics - getting subsidies by allying with Russia instead of seeking western support. President Lukashenka was elected on July 20, 1994, defeating Kebich, his opponent. The views of the two hardly differed. Both campaigned on the pro-Russian platform, and Lukashenka claimed that he was the only member of Belarusian Parliament to vote against the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.¹³⁸

Fearing NATO expansion, Lukashenka actively sought to enhance Belarusian security in the union with the Russian Federation and even scared the world by suspending the transfer of nuclear weapons in 1995 describing the removal as unnecessary due to the approaching Russian-Belarusian union.¹³⁹ Upon signing the Belarusian-Russian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1995, Russia was permitted to retain its military presence in Belarus until 2010 and secured free-of-charge use of Belarusian air defense facilities. Although the weapons transfers were resumed and completed by November 1996, Lukashenka stated that NATO actions might force Russia to redeploy the nuclear weapons on the Belarusian territory and that he would not mind.¹⁴⁰ When NATO forces entered Kosovo, Lukashenka called the decision to withdraw nuclear weapons “a crude mistake, if not a crime.”¹⁴¹ Despite his belligerent remarks, on November 27, 1996, “with all the pomp of a presidential ceremony,” the last nuclear warhead, held back for the symbolic ceremony, left Belarus.¹⁴²

Conclusion:

Although monetary compensation, economic sanctions, lack of technical know-how, and experiencing Chernobyl nuclear tragedy played a role in the denuclearization of Belarus and Ukraine, the dynamics of the disarmament process of the two countries are best explained by the differences in the national identity conceptions of their leaders combined with the countries' changing priorities in 1990-96. The majority of the Belarusian left parliamentarians possessed sportsmanlike subaltern NICs toward Russia. As a result, they never disputed Moscow's claim on the nuclear weapons and never conceived of bargaining with the superpowers. A change in the nuclear posture for Belarus occurred with the election of President Lukashenka in 1994 who possessed oppositional consciousness towards NATO.

The above analysis demonstrates the applicability of Jacques Hymans' national identity conception in explaining policy choices that go beyond building a nuclear bomb. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that proliferation and denuclearization are different phenomena. The research also demonstrated that decisionmakers' support for denuclearization does not depend on their NICs alone, and may be reversed with time. In both countries, the first rallies around denuclearization were led by the very national movements that later became reluctant to accede to the NPT. Had different leaders come to power in Belarus and Ukraine in 1990, it is unclear whether the nuclear weapons would have been removed so soon.

The limitations of my research come from determining a leader's NIC from his foreign policy choices and statements without undertaking a comprehensive content analysis of the leader's speeches to adequately test the theory. My results should be interpreted as a comparison of Belarusian and Ukrainian leaders on the dimensions of status and solidarity, showing that one leader was more oppositional than the other (for which the data used in the paper was sufficient) rather than ascribing them ideal-typical NICs.

Economic conditions alone were insufficient to provide for denuclearization, and the

nature of the state's relationship with Russia was an important factor. The United States and other third parties wishing to influence denuclearization need to be aware of the power dynamics between the negotiating countries and pay attention to ethnicity and culture problems as well as a state's need for sovereignty or political recognition. This approach may spare the negotiators some carrots and avoid the counterproductive effects that sticks may have.

¹ "Belarus joins the NPT," *Sovetskaya Belarus*, Feb. 2, 1993.

² "Posledniye Boegolovki Pokinuli Strany," *Sovietskaya Belarus*, Nov. 27, 1994.

³ Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter, "The Denuclearization of Ukraine" in Bernauer, Ruloff, *The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999): 111-156 (119).

⁴ "Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty," U.S. Department of State, <<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2001/3523.htm>> (May 1, 2008).

⁵ Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter, "The Denuclearization of Ukraine," 121-23.

⁶ Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 129.

⁷ Hrihoriy Perepelytsia, "The Belarus Factor in The European Policy of Ukraine" in Balmaceda, Clem, Tarlow, *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinant, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002): 302-319 (305).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 305. Also see "The Delegation of Belarus and Ukraine spoke at the plenary session of the conference" (Delegaia Belarusi i Ukrainy vystupila na Plenum konferencii), *Sovetskaya Belarus*, Feb. 19, 1993.

⁹ Jacques E. C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006).

¹⁰ Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, (McGraw Hill, Inc: 1979), 97.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹² Ruth Deyemord, *Security and Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 7.

¹³ Andrew Sannikov, "Russia's Varied Roles in Belarus" in Balmaceda, Clem, Tarlow, *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinant, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002): 222-231 (223).

¹⁴ Glenn H. Snyder *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), 31.

¹⁵ Robert Legvold and Celeste A. Wallander (SCIS), *Swords and Sustenance: the economics of security in Belarus and Ukraine*. (Cambridge, MA : American Academy of Arts and Sciences : MIT Press, 2004) , 64.

¹⁶ Snyder, 19.

¹⁷ Article 4.2 of the NPT states: "All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." ("Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", IAEA, 1970.)

¹⁸ Hymans, 13.

¹⁹ Ibid., 12.

²⁰ Christopher A. Stevens, "Identity Politics and National Security Interests: Deciding the Fate of Soviet Military Assets in Estonia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine," for Poster Session, "Multiple Identities: Culture, Gender, and Sovereignty," at the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii; Mar. 3, 2005. 34.

²¹ Hymans, 37.

²² Ibid., 13.

²³ Ibid., 28-37.

²⁴ Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively" in Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

²⁵ Hymans, 17.

²⁶ Sharova, N. S., "Materials of Belarusian History" ("Materialy po Istorii Belarusi"), ed. Stashkevich, Galechenka (Minsk, 2001), 213.

²⁷ Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, Suzette Grillot, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" *Political Psychology*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Dec., 1996): 727-757 (739).

²⁸ Sharova, 213.

²⁹ Ibid., 245.

³⁰ Marko Bojcum, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2, (Mar., 1995), 229-249.

³¹ Chafetz, Abramson, Grillot, 751.

³² Hymans, 20.

³³ Rainer Lindner, "The Lukashenka Phenomenon" in Balmaceda, Clem, Tarlow, *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinant, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002): 77-108.

³⁴ Hymans, 20.

³⁵ Ibid., 20.

³⁶ Ibid., 22, 48.

³⁷ Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy as an Instrument of Nation Building," in Blaney, *The Successor States to the USSR* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995): 196-207 (199).

³⁸ Sharova, 110.

³⁹ Ibid., 118.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 183.

⁴¹ David R. Marples and Uladzimir Padhol, "The Opposition in Belarus: History, Potential and Perspectives" in Balmaceda, Clem, Tarlow, *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinant, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002): 55-76 (66).

⁴² Later the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) and the People's Rukh of Ukraine.

⁴³ The first alternative to the Communist Party – "Popular Front" – was formed in both Belarus and Ukraine only in 1989, following the example of the Baltic states. See Balmaceda, Clem, Tarlow, *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinant, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West*, also Sharova, *Materials of Belarusian History*.

⁴⁴ Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) Goals and Policies "Adradzennie" < http://pages.prodigy.net/dr_fission/bpf/>

⁴⁵ Ibid.

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- ⁴⁶ See Rukh in *Politychni partii Ukrainy*. Kyiv: tov. "KIS", 1998
- ⁴⁷ Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Massandra Summit and Ukraine," 4.
- ⁴⁸ People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) <<http://www.nru.org.ua/en/diverse/?id=1>>
- ⁴⁹ Deyermond, 68.
- ⁵⁰ Eric Hobsbawm, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today" in Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*, (New York: Verso, 2000): 255-266 (256).
- ⁵¹ Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 196.
- ⁵² Jane Shapiro Zacek, Ilpyong J. Kim. *The Legacy of the Soviet Bloc*, Inc NetLibrary page, 102
- ⁵³ *The New York Times*, Apr. 29, 1992.
- ⁵⁴ Stevens, 37.
- ⁵⁵ Beissinger, 196.
- ⁵⁶ The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was officially dissolved in 1991 and succeeded by Communist Party of Ukraine (1993) and Communist Party of Belarus (1996).
- ⁵⁷ Ukrainian Communist Party Mandate in *Politychni partii Ukrainy*. (Kyiv: tov. "KIS", 1998).
- ⁵⁸ *Itar-Tass*, Kiev, June 15, 1994.
- ⁵⁹ Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 57, No. 3, (Aug., 1995), 743-775 (758).
- ⁶⁰ Hymans, 39.
- ⁶¹ Deyermond, 93.
- ⁶² Hymans, 23.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, 24.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁶⁶ Darden, Keith and Anna Grzymala-Busse "The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse" by The Johns Hopkins University Press, *World Politics* 59.1 (2006) 83-115. Also in Arkady Moshes, Vitali Silitski. *Political Trends in the New Eastern Europe: Ukraine and Belarus*, 17-18.
- ⁶⁷ *The New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1994.
- ⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1993
- ⁶⁹ Jurgen Habermas, "The European Nation-state – Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship" in Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 2000): 281-295 (281).
- ⁷⁰ It is interesting to compare the official statements of Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders upon signing the CIS agreement. Kravchuk underscored equality and independence: "Three sovereign republics have shown an example of new integration in new historical and political circumstances". Shushkevich focused on Belarus' weakness: "We were very worried about the dissolution of the USSR and this is why we took an initiative to sign the Agreement on establishment of the CIS." Kebich also stressed the impossibility that Belarus can survive outside of a bigger entity: "If the CIS will turn out to be unsustainable, it is inevitable that after a certain time on the biggest part of the former USSR after a certain time a new similar formation will emerge" (*Sovetskaya Belorussia*, Dec. 9, 1991)
- ⁷¹ Sharova, N. S., *Materials of Belarusian History*, 180
- ⁷² Ukrainian Declaration of State Sovereignty specifically mentions "the prevalence of general human values over class values," marking Ukraine's decisive break with the Soviet past. By

contrast, Belarusian Declaration proposes in Article 11 “to commence immediately the elaboration of an agreement on a union of sovereign socialist states” a year before formal independence was proclaimed. All this speaks to the subaltern NICs of Belarusian leaders who lacked nationalistic pride of their Ukrainian counterparts and doubted that Belarus could survive without Russian backing. (*Declaration of State Sovereignty of Belarusian and Ukrainian SSR*)

⁷³ *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1993.

⁷⁴ Yuri Dubinin, “How Ukraine became a nonnuclear state,” *International Life*, vol. 1, (2004) «Как Украина стала безъядерным государством» *Международная жизнь*, № 1, 2004

⁷⁵ Popadiuk, *American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations*.

⁷⁶ Shushkevich’s oppositional subaltern NIC stands out in his testimony *Hearing: Belarus at the Crossroads* to the U.S. Commission On Security And Cooperation in Europe. He identifies the oppositional other as Russia: “Geopolitical interests of Russia are the main obstacles on the path of making Belarus a democratic, law-abiding, neutral nation, an important element for stability and security in Europe [...] Russia does not conceal its intentions that it wants to swallow Belarus under the guise of "unification" [...] In short, it is necessary to expand the Russian empire by suppressing the national self-awareness of the Belarusian people, and utilizing the state of poverty in Belarus [...] There is no mention of the fact that one of the causes of poverty in Belarus is Russia itself [...]” (Shuskevich, *Hearing: Belarus at the Crossroads* to the U.S. Commission On Security And Cooperation in Europe)

⁷⁷ *The New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1994.

⁷⁸ Hymans, 40.

⁷⁹ David R. Marples, *Belarus : from Soviet rule to nuclear catastrophe*. (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996),127.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁸¹ Chafetz ,750.

⁸² For example, Shulman notes that Ukrainian support for autonomy or independence from Russia varies with the performance of Ukraine’s economy. (Stephen Shulman, “The Role of Economic Performance in Ukrainian Nationalism” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 2, (Mar., 2003), 217-239.

⁸³ Erik S. Herron, “Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed-Member Systems: Evidence from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3, (Aug., 2002), 361-382.

⁸⁴ Marples, 117.

⁸⁵ For example, foreign minister Zlenko asserted, “Ukraine never played any role in the decision-making process which led to the creation of the third largest nuclear force in the world on its territory” in *Sovetskaya Belorussia*, Feb. 16, 1993.

⁸⁶ Dawson, Jane I. *Eco-nationalism : anti-nuclear activism and national identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine*. (Durham : Duke University Press, 1996), 81.

⁸⁷ Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Offering to Mediate Russian-Ukrainian Disputes on Security," *The New York Times*, Dec. 4, 1993.

⁸⁸ The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Belarus was adopted on July 27, 1990 by the Supreme Council of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR). The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine was adopted on July 16, 1990 by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

⁸⁹ (Art. 5). Declaration of State Sovereignty, Ukraine

⁹⁰ (Art. 10). Declaration of State Sovereignty, Ukraine

⁹¹ For example, the noted Ukrainian tendency toward the anti-imperialism speaks to the nationalist desire to remain independent from Russia (Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot).

⁹² Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot, 748.

⁹³ Ibid., 749.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 750.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 751.

⁹⁶ Before the office of president was instituted in 1994.

⁹⁷ Stevens, 35.

⁹⁸ Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 7, (Nov., 1997), 1293-1316.

⁹⁹ "Against each other like wave and stone: Kebich and Lukashenka," *Sovetskaya Belorussia*, №160, July 9, 1994, ("Они сошлись волна и камень: Кебич и Лукашенко).

¹⁰⁰ Reaction of Ukraine to BPF's debacle was expressed in Ukrainian press "Voting results in Belarus challenge Ukraine's bid for independence and imply major corrections of its foreign policy." (Volodymyr Zvighyanich *Ukrainian Weekly*, The 06-18-1995).

¹⁰¹ Marples, 116.

¹⁰² Deyermond, 85-86.

¹⁰³ Bojcun.

¹⁰⁴ BRAMA - Election Results in Ukraine <<http://www.brama.com/ua-gov/el-94vrd.html>> May 9, 2008.

¹⁰⁵ Because of the historic compromise between the ruling Communists and the opposition in August 1991, the Communist Party leadership agreed to the banning of their party and supported independence movements in exchange for their individual relation of the key positions. (Marko Bojcun "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2, (Mar., 1995), 229-249).

¹⁰⁶ Stevens.

¹⁰⁷ Roman Popadiuk, *American Ukrainian Nuclear Relations*, McNair Paper 55, Oct. 1996. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 33).

¹⁰⁸ In Article 10 on Armed Forces, Nuclear-Free Zone, "Belarus sets the aim to make its territory a nuclear-free zone and to become a neutral state". In Article 9 on external and internal security, "The Ukrainian SSR solemnly declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons."

¹⁰⁹ Ukraine passes the resolution "On the Nuclear-Free Status of Ukraine" (Roman Popadiuk, *American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996).

¹¹⁰ Deyermond, 71.

¹¹¹ Stevens, 42.

¹¹² Shevtsov, A. Tactical nuclear weapons: a perspective from Ukraine. Geneva : United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, [2000]. Also Bernauer, 115.

¹¹³ Ibid. Also Popadiuk, 49.

¹¹⁴ Bernauer, 119.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 112, 116.

¹¹⁶ Popadiuk, 56.

¹¹⁷ Bernauer 119-120.

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- ¹¹⁸ Deyermond, 79.
- ¹¹⁹ Bertsch, Gary K. and William C. Potter. *Dangerous Weapons, Desperate states*. Routledge: New York, 1999, 53. Also *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1993.
- ¹²⁰ Deyermond, 69.
- ¹²¹ *RFE/RL Daily Report*, Sept. 6, 7, 9 and 14, 1993.
- ¹²² Bernauer, 122; Also Popadiuk.
- ¹²³ Deyermond, 72-73.
- ¹²⁴ Bernauer, 125.
- ¹²⁵ Bernauer, 122-23.
- ¹²⁶ Bernauer, 119.
- ¹²⁷ Wilson, Stevens.
- ¹²⁸ "Text Of Resolution Detailing NPT Reservations," *Radio Ukraine world service (Kiev)*, FBIS, Nov. 16, 1994.
- ¹²⁹ "Ukraine Renounces Nuclear Arms, START-I Enters Force," REUTER, 12/5/94; in executive news service, Dec. 5, 1994.
- ¹³⁰ *The New York Times*, June 5, 1996.
- ¹³¹ Balmaceda, 7.
- ¹³² Deyermond, 91.
- ¹³³ *Ibid.*, 89.
- ¹³⁴ Deputy Pyotr Krauchanka wanted that nuclear weapons to be destroyed in Belarus and said the country deserved \$1.5 billion for the uranium from its strategic missiles. In *Sovetskaya Belarus*, Sept. 1993.
- ¹³⁵ Shushkevich disagreed: "Only Russia has the moral right to possess nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union." In *Sovetskaya Belarus*, June 1, 1993.
- ¹³⁶ Deyermond, 88.
- ¹³⁷ *The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1993.
- ¹³⁸ "Kebich and Lukashenka. Volna i kamen," *Sovetskaya Belarus*, June 5, 1994.
- ¹³⁹ Deyermond, 92.
- ¹⁴⁰ Deyermond, 93.
- ¹⁴¹ *Belarusian Review*, fall 1998: 29.
- ¹⁴² "Belarus ships last nuclear missile to Russia," CNN, Nov. 27, 1997.